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I.

INTRODUCTIOI

A continuing and longstanding debate has been waged in corporate law scholarship
among those who favor shareholder primacy, those who favor management discretion,
and those who believe that corporations have a social responsibility to other
constituencies, such as the corporation's employees, and the wider public interest. I
Although the battle lines wax and wane, shareholder primacy prevails today as the
dominant view,2 with management discretion advocates in the minority, and with
advocates of corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a rearguard. 3 Many discussants

1. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY Bus.
L.J. 59, 66-76 (2005) (discussing the different paradigms with which to address corporate law); Jill Fisch,
Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 638 (2006)
(challenging the shareholder primacy position); David Millon, Theories of the COIporation, 1990 DUKE L.J.
201, 220-29 (describing the different positions in this debate as arguing over the fundamental nature of
corporate activity and the appropriate goals of corporate law). The scheme described in the text is simplified.
Many writers traverse the categories. For example, management discretion can be coupled with social
responsibility. Shareholder value, ifnot shareholder primacy, can be coupled with management discretion.
For a useful categorization of the shareholder primacy versus management discretion debate, see
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 261
(1992). Allen describes shareholder primacy as the "property conception" view: since the corporation is owned
by its shareholders and the directors are the agents of the shareholders, the duty of the directors is to maximize
the value of the corporation and thus the shareholders' residual interest. !d. at 266-70. Allen situates the
management discretion view in the "entity conception" of the firm: since managers will act in the firm's best
interests, granting managers greater discretion is better for corporations~and thus ultimately for shareholders~
in the long run. Id. at 270-n.
2. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reiriier Kraakman, The End ofHistory for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. LJ.
439,439 (2001) ("There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally
strive to increase long-term shareholder value."); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm
and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2063, 2065 (2001) (noting that "[s]hareholder wealth
maximization is usually accepted as the appropriate goal in American business circles" without normatively
endorsing the proposition).
3. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 72-74 (noting that each generation revives the social responsibility
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think of themselves as picking up where Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and E. Merrick Dodd left off
in their famous, precedent-setting debate of the 1930s. 4 The generally-accepted historical
picture puts Berle in the position of being the grandfather of shareholder primacy. 5 Dodd,
on the other hand, is cast as the original ancestor of CSR.6 But this categorization of
Berle and Dodd is mistaken-an example of failing to understand old texts in their
original context.
This Article corrects these mistakes and offers a new reading of these fundamental
texts of corporate law, texts that recently reached their 75th anniversaries: Berle's 1931
article, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust,7 Dodd's 1932 response, For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?,8 Berle's subsequent 1932 rebuttal For Whom Corporate
Managers Are Trustees: A Note,9 and, finally, Berle's famous book with Gardiner C.
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property,10 also published in 1932. 11 Our

critique despite its rearguard status). We note that concern for constituent interests does not necessarily imply a
rejection of shareholder primacy. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 1519 (1997) (recommending changes in pension fund investment practices).
4. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 1, at 647 ("The origins of the shareholder primacy norm can be found in
the classic debate between Merrick Dodd and Adolph Berle in the 1930's...."); Millon, supra note 1, at 22023 (beginning its discussion of shareholder primacy with an evaluation of the debate between Berle and Dodd);
Donald E. Schwarz, Defining the Corporate Objective, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511,521 (1984) (incorporating
a brief discussion of the Berle-Dodd debate); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 81-91 (2002) (discussing the Ber!e-Dodd debate in depth).
5. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of COlporate Governance, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 547,561 (2003) ("Berle thought the law should put renewed emphasis on managers' fiduciary
duty to maximize shareholder wealth."); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion ofLaw, 103 MICH. L. REV. I,
34 (2004) ("Berle described the protection of shareholders as the critical challenge facing corporate law....");
John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the LongTerm Shareholder Model of Corporate
Governance, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1313, 1330 (1992) (substantiating Ber!e's status as grandfather of shareholder
primacy); Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1189,
1189 (2002) ("Berle argued for what is now called 'shareholder primacy'-the view that the corporation exists
only to make money for its shareholders."); Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?:
Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 115-16
(2004) (describing briefly the Berle-Dodd debate).
6. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 561 ("Dodd argued that corporations have a 'social service
[responsibility] as well as a profit-making function.''') (quoting E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145, 1148 (1932»; Bratton supra note 1, at 74 (noting that the CSR
position originated with Dodd); Chen & Hanson, supra note 5, at 35 ("Merrick Dodd framed the corporate law
problem in terms ... emphasizing the threat posed by corporations to nonshareholders."); George Dent, Jr.,
Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 1. CORP. L. 39,50 (2005) (noting that the CSR position
originated with Dodd); Matheson & Olson, supra note 5, at 1330 (same); Stout, supra note 5, at 1189 (noting
Dodd's advocacy of the CSR position); Winkler, supra note 5, at 115-16 (noting that the CSR position
originated with Dodd).
7. Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers As Powers In Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931) [hereinafter
Berle, Powers in Trust].
8. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1932)
[hereinafter Dodd, Trustees].
9. Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1365 (1932)
[hereinafter Berle, Trustees Note].
10. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(Macmillan 1933) (1932).
11. One of us has appraised the book through a more modem theoretical lens. See William W. Bratton,
Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 1. CORP. L. 737 (2001) (comparing Berle and Means
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reading resituates these texts in the historical and intellectual context in which they were
written.
The time was the Great Depression, then believed to have resulted from the inherent
instabilities of a capitalist system. The consensus was that emerging, modem corporate
institutions were an integral part of the flawed system and thus part of the problem. The
question of social responsibility was whether corporations should be treated as public
institutions with obligations to mitigate the system's inherent instability, even if these
obligations conflicted with maximizing shareholder returns. Parties to today's debate
between shareholder primacy and management discretion ignore that question, even as it
continues to be posed by the social responsibility rearguard. Today's mainstream assumes
maximal returns to the firm as the only end and debates solely about the means, 12 with
the dispute centered on the allocation of authority between managers and shareholders. 13
In contrast, both Berle and Dodd answered yes to the question of CSR. The legal
allocation of authority within the firm did come up in their discussion at a secondary
level, but in a convoluted posture that can be made intelligible only by reference to the
evolution of Berle's thinking in the rapidly changing political environment of the early
1930s. Any resemblance between the normative issues Berle and Dodd discussed and
those in today's debate between management discretion and shareholder rights is more
apparent than real.
For Berle and Dodd, the normative issue was the appropriate policy response to the
crisis of the Great Depression. In 1932, when Berle and Dodd started their debate, it was
abundantly clear that the job of formulating that policy would fall into the hands of a new
Democratic administration likely to be headed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). It
was expected, although not yet certain, that FDR would follow the lead of many
European leaders of the time and adopt a form of corporatism as the political economy of
the United States.
Corporatism sharply differs from the pluralism that dominated political thinking
both before and after the New Deal. Under pluralism, only the preferences of individuals
in their role as citizens count in the welfare calculus of government policy, and
competition for the votes of individuals in a political marketplace determines policy
outcomes. Corporatism privileges cooperation over competition and emphasizes group
over individual interests. 14 It assumes that government, through consultation with the

with corporate legal theories presented by John Dewey and William O. Douglas).
12. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARv. L. REv. 833
(2005) (discussing the allocation of power between boards of publicly traded companies and their shareholders),
and Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1784 (2006) (proposing
arguments to increase shareholder decision-making power), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1735 (2006) (critiquing Bebchuck's proposal to increase
shareholder power).
13. For an account that connects the increased institutional importance of the board of directors in
governance to market-based opportunities for more aggressive protection of the shareholder interest, see Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Rise ofIndependent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and the
Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1465 (2007). For a recent article advocating institutional reform for the
purpose of enhancing shareholder power, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93
VA. L. REv. 675 (2007).
14. One of us recently described the corporatist context of the New Deal. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor
Unions: A COIporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (2007) (discussing the
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major groups in society, can articulate an objectively cognizable "public interest." Once
the public interest is expressed, government calls on the various groups, with the
corporation being one of the most important, to adapt their positions in support of it.
Corporatism implies a radical restatement of the purpose of the business corporation.
It does assume capitalism and a system of private property rights and has no trouble
accepting the legal model under which directors must maximize the value of the
corporation. But it does this only at the threshold, the point at which corporations come to
the state-directed table where the groups determine the public interest. Given a
determination, the calculus of corporate rights and duties must adjust and recognize a
public interest constraint. Specifically, corporate directors have a duty to manage the
business and affairs of the corporation in accordance with clearly articulated public
policies, even if those policies interfere with the property interests of shareholders.
Putting this in the terms of the theory of the firm, corporatism views the corporation as an
entity that operates as an organ of the state and assumes social responsibilities.
Both Berle and Dodd brought these corporatist assumptions to their debate. That
alone inserts a normative barrier between their discussion and today's back-and-forth
between shareholder primacy and management discretion in a pluralist and marketoriented political context. It also introduces a significant contextual barrier between Berle
and Dodd and modem CSR. Two questions arise in light of this barrier: first, what
exactly were Berle and Dodd fighting about, and, second, whatever that was, how can it
be that today's corporate legal theorists so casually assume the Berle-Dodd debate's
continuing pertinence? By hypothesis, there must be a theoretical account that gets us
over the barrier and explains the connection between the Berle-Dodd debate and the
subsequent evolution of corporate legal theory. There is, but the answers to the two
questions are much more complicated than they appear to the modem reader.
This Article works through the complications, holding out solutions to a number of
puzzles long unsolved in corporate legal theory. The binary picture of Berle as
shareholder primacy and Dodd as CSR appears on a noisy historical screen. Some
modem writers do acknowledge Berle as a CSR ancestor,15 introducing a conflicting
characterization. The conflict follows from contradictions in Berle's texts, with parts of
The Modern Corporation and the 1932 rebuttal supporting a shareholder primacy
reading, while other passages in The Modern Corporation presage CSR. Compounding
the confusion, Dodd can also be read in different ways. Although most align him with
modem CSR, others see him more as an advocate for management discretion, with social
responsibility as just another area inside the zone of business judgment. Berle himself
made the latter characterization of Dodd, 16 as do a small number of modem writers. 17 A
changes in the political economy and its effect on labor unions over the last 50 years).
15. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 1, at 68 (arguing that proponents of Berle expanded his theories to
include public interests); Millon, supra note 1, at 222 (quoting an acknowledgement by Berle that another legal
system may require corporate social responsibility); Terry A. O'Neill, Toward a Theory of the Closely Held
Firm, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 603, 619-20 (1993) (claiming that Berle predicted future firms would be socially
responsible).
16. Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 442-43 (1962)
[hereinafter Berle, Modern Functions].
17. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT 186--87
(2001) (demonstrating that Dodd believed business people with power would act responsibly); Thomas W. Joo,
Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL Eouc. 351, 353 (2004) (stating that Dodd believed
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third puzzle stems from changes of position in both authors' later writings. Dodd reversed
his 1932 position in 1941,18 to be followed by Berle's concession in 1954 that Dodd's
debate position had been proven correct. 19
This Article shows that these complications followed from adjustments of position
made by both Berle and Dodd as events unfolded in their own time, a context so far
removed from that which exists today as to block either side from a legitimate claim to
direct ancestry. PaIi II looks at Berle's evolution from a 1920s corporate lawyer to a
1930s academic and public intellectual. We call this the transition from Early Berle, who
did indeed articulate a version of shareholder primacy, to Middle Berle, a corporatist on
the national political stage. The discussion details the basic terms of corporatist political
theory and their brief appearance in federal law in the National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933. Part III takes up The Modern Corporation,20 distinguishing the parts of the book
that set out Early Berle positions from the parts that anticipate Middle Berle, fleshing out
the latter by reference to Berle's contemporaneous political writing. Part IV unpacks the
Berle-Dodd debate, including rebuttals and later recantations. Part V moves on to Berle's
post-war modification of his Depression~era corporatism, which we call Late Berle,
highlighting the minor role he accorded to corporate governance in a scheme that
integrated the legal firm within a broader theory of economics, politics, and society. Part
VI relocates Berle and Dodd in the context of today's debates with indeterminate results.
Our restatement of Berle and Means and Berle and Dodd poses a question as to
modem day implications: if the modem shareholder primacy position is indeed rooted in
Berle, then does the shareholder primacy viewpoint gain coherence once Berle's true
position is understood? The same question can be asked of the coherence of the
viewpoint of the CSR rearguard with respect to the contextualized depictions of Berle
and Dodd. The Conclusion addresses these questions.
Our contextualization of Berle and Means and Berle and Dodd may also hold
lessons for the future. This is a story about corporate law at a time of regime change.
Berle, as a political figure and corporate law scholar, was at the center of this change in
regime. The question was whether the capitalist system could survive outside of the
regulated state. For Berle, the challenge then was to find a way for corporate law to deal
constructively with regulatory issues. Because those issues arose outside of the corporate
law box, thinking inside of the corporate law box could not adequately address them.
Accordingly, the narrowly drawn fiduciary duty that protects only the residual claim of
the shareholders was inadequate. Berle widened the scope of the duty so that directors
could not only address and comply with a broad, new set of government-specified rules,
but also be cooperative participants in a common enterprise with the regulators. In
today's shareholder primacy world, corporations are compliant, but not cooperative

corporations serve certain segments of society); Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of
151 U. PA. L. REv. 1861,1894-95 (2003) (illustrating that Dodd believed business
practices would support social goals).
18. See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The Modem Corporation. Private Property, and Recent Federal
Legislation, 54 HARV. L. REv. 917,925-27 (1941) [hereinafter Dodd, Modern Corporation) (explaining his
views on American corporations).
19. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954) [hereinafter BERLE,
20TH CENTURY).
20. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10.

Progressive Corporate Law,
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players of the regulatory game. When the existing regime runs its course and a new
regime dawns, as at some point it certainly will, Berle's cooperative model of corporate
duties may become relevant once again.
II. EARLY TO MIDDLE BERLE: FROM CORPORATE LAWYER TO CORPORATIST

Adolf Berle received a Rockefeller Foundation grant for an "interdisciplinary" study
of corporations in 1927,21 a project that five years later would result in The Modern
Corporation and Private Property. The performance of the American economy would
change rapidly and radically during the five-year period of research and composition, and
so would Berle's ideas about regulation and corporate law. He began the period as an
advocate of corporate self-regulation. He soon shifted to a view favoring judicially
enforced shareholder primacy. He also was reflecting on the broader political economy,
emerging in 1932-1933 as an advocate of corporatist solutions to the national economic
crisis. His views registered strongly both in FDR's 1932 campaign and in the legislative
program of the Hundred Days of 1933, when corporatism came to the fore in national
regulatory policy. This Part recounts this development, laying the groundwork for our
reconsideration of The Modern Corporation and the Berle-Dodd debate in Parts III and
IV.

A. Early Berle: From SelfRegulation to Judicially Enforced Shareholder Primacy
At the time of the Rockefeller Foundation grant, Berle was a Wall Street lawyer
with an academic bent. Strictly speaking, that description fit him for the rest of his career:
although he took up an academic appointment at Columbia Law School in 1928, Berle
never closed his downtown law office. At the same time, Berle the lawyer published a
well-known series of commentaries on corporate law. 22 Berle focused on management
power and the shareholders' inability to control it even in these early writings. 23 The
separation of ownership and control, then a new phenomenon, was occasioning
reexamination of settled matters of law. Management power had traditionally been
restricted in the articles of incorporation, or, alternatively, by owner-shareholders. By the
time ownership dispersed in the early decades of the twentieth century, the large
corporations had general charters that omitted the restrictions. Managers emerged with
new powers-they could enter new businesses and issue new stock to fund the ventures
at will. Courts and legislatures were grappling with how to treat the inherited legal
framework in light of this development. 24 Should charters be interpreted as complete
21. JORDA A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF A AMERICAN ERA 51 (1987).
22. For a summary of this series, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE
(1928) [hereinafter BERLE, CORPORATE FINANCE].
23. See id. at v-vi, 26-34 (arguing that allowing managers to determine the property rights of shareholders
eroded their ability to control corporations); id. at 37 (stating that shareholders cannot afford to enforce their
rights).
24. Statutes of general incorporation became common in the 1870s and 1880s. JAMES WILLARD HURST,
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION [N THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 56
(1970). However, this first generation of general incorporation statutes carried numerous restrictions on the
form a corporation could take. Id. at 56-57. Over the next several decades, there was debate over how strong
these restrictions should be. Id. A second generation of incorporation statutes that made the corporate purpose
provisions a default rather than a mandatory provision became common in the 1930s. Id. at 69-71.
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contracts and enforced according to their literal terms, or were there implied fiduciary
constraints that required judicial enforcement?
The Berle of the 1920s favored a contractual approach. He expressed skepticism
respecting prospects for constructive judicial intervention: "[C]ourts cannot be expected
to work out rules of conduct for the business community except with the guidance and
assistance of business men themselves, and for this purpose business standards
themselves must be made apparent."25
For this Berle, the problem was that the sources of corporate regulation-corporate
charters and statutes-were not helping to make "business standards" apparent. Then, as
now, the standard practice favored broad drafting toward the end of according
management discretion to run the business. Berle, looking to protect the interests of the
holders of shares in publicly traded firms, saw a need for constraints on management
discretion. He wanted the problem to be solved by "business men themselves," and
looked to self-regulatory reforms. 26 More particularly, he suggested: (1) that investment
bankers organize themselves into an enforcement body to facilitate scrutiny (and
screening) of firms making public securities offerings; (2) that the stock exchanges
withhold listing from firms whose managers abused their power and demand disclosure
of corporate information; and (3) that large institutional shareholders like insurance
companies position themselves to obtain accurate information about issuers and to protect
shareholder rights. 27 With respect to institutional shareholders he had a more specific
suggestion:
Suppose ... trust companies were in the habit of accepting, on "custodian
account," deposits of stocks from small shareholders, thereby gathering many
small holdings into an institution commanding a block so large that protection
was worth while, and that they also provided themselves with power to
represent the depositors of stock. Such institutions could easily keep
themselves informed as to the affairs of the corporation ... and, as representing
their clients, could take the action necessary to prevent or rectifY violations of
. ht s .... 28
proper ty ng
Ironically, each of the items on Berle's list has shown up prominently in recent
governance debates. 29 Those advancing these positions today do so from the deregulatory
wing of the corporate law academy, inviting the label "contractarian.,,30 The political

25.
26.

BERLE, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 22, at 36.
For a contemporary articulation of this position rooted in the economic theory of the firm, see Edward
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-Governing Corporation,
149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619 (2001).
27. BERLE, CORPORATE FINAL"ICE, supra note 22, at 37-39.
28. Id. at 39.
29. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A SelfEnforcing Model of COl porate Law, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1910 (1996) (arguing that large outside shareholders could self-enforce corporate governance
standards); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453 (1997) (suggesting selfregulation by the securities exchanges); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) (advocating a market-oriented approach of competitive
federalism to securities regulation).
30. For an exposition of the contractarian point of view, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK' & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991) (explaining contractarianism).
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implications were quite different in the 1920s, however. Berle was staking a position as a
reformer. Indeed, his approach had a precise analogue in the industrial pluralism of the
institutional economist John R. Commons, with its view of the state as the enforcer of
bargains entered into by self-constituted groups representing adverse economic
interests. 31 Berle, in fact, contemporaneously published short opinion pieces that
speculated about movement toward worker ownership. 32
Berle's attitude toward regulation would change even before the stock market
crashed. 33 The catalyst was Gardiner Means. Berle's Rockefeller grant required the
participation of an economist. This prompted Berle to engage Means, an economics
graduate student and childhood friend,34 as a "statistical and economics research
assistant.,,35 Means contributed The Modern Corporation's empirical studies of corPorate
concentration and dispersed share ownership.36 His empirical results showed that onethird of the national wealth lay in the hands of 200 large corporations. Means projected
that, given continuation of the present rate of growth of that relative share, 70% of
economic activity would be carried on by 200 corporations by 1950, even as share
ownership became more and more dispersed. 37 The upshot was that economic power was
concentrating in the hands of a cluster of corporate managers, the same group whose
level of responsibility already had come to concern Berle. (These projections of
increasing concentration would prove to be fundamentally wrong, but only much later;
classical economics was still in its infancy.)38 At the time, Means' projections sent a loud
and clear message: something had to be done about corporate power, something more
than Berle had thought previously. Berie changed his views accordingly. What he
formerly saw as a governance problem to be treated contractually within the financial
community, he now came to see as a case for judicial control in the name of the
shareholder interest. 39
Berle stated this position in Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust in the Harvard
Law Review in 193 1,40 an article that previewed legal points in the upcoming The
Modern Corporation without a hint as to the political-economic framework in which the
book would encase them. More particularly, the article restates what was then considered
the problem of corporate power: "Of recent years aggregations of capital have been
collected from the public sale of stock in corporations with paper powers which are broad
enough to permit them to rove the world at wi11.,,41 The article then launches into a

31. See Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers? Industrial Pluralists, Legal Realists, and the Law of
Industrial Disputes, 1915-1943, 11 LAW & HIST. REv. 59, 66-68 (1993).
32. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 65.
33. The change had occurred by the spring of 1929. Id. at 55.
34. Id. at 51.
35. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 1918-1971, at 21 (Beatrice Bishop Berie & Travis
Beal Jacobs, eds. 1973) [hereinafter BERLE, RAPIDS].
36. Berie eventually conceded co-authorship and one-third of the royalties. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at

58-59.
37.
38.

BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 9,37,40.
Berle would later be forced to adjust his numbers as the prediction failed to prove out. See infra text
accompanying note 267-68.
39. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 56.
40. Berle, Powers in Trust, supra note 7.
41. Id. at 1066.
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discussion of fiduciary duty as a means of addressing the problem, asserting that the
arguably archaic and longstanding rule that a corporation was for the benefit of its owners
remained true when ownership and control were separated. 42 Managers were trustees of
the shareholders and so might only exercise their wide ranging powers for the benefit of
the shareholders. More particularly, "the use of the power is subject to equitable
limitation when the power has been exercised to the detriment of [shareholder] interest,
however absolute the grant of power may be in terms, and however correct the technical
exercise of it may have been. ,,43 The role of the judiciary was to enforce this principle.
This was by no means a settled principle of law. Berle accordingly marshaled the
cases, pointing to a variety of rules that constrained exercises of managerial authority.
For example, the directors' power to issue stock was limited by the requirement that the
ratable interest of existing and prospective shareholders be protected. 44 The power of
directors to withhold dividends provided a second example: while directors generally had
freedom to withhold dividends, courts would force distribution when the reason for the
withholding was a non-business purpose. 45 Third, the power to acquire stock in another
corporation had to be used for the benefit of the acquiring corporation and not for
managerial interests. 46 A final example involved the power to amend the certificate of
incorporation. In this setting, the power rested with the majority of shareholders rather
than the directors, but the rule remained the same-majority power was subject to
equitable limitations. 47 The only distinction between the exercise of shareholder power
and that of directors was that the "vote of shareholders would at least tend to create a
presumption that action taken benefits all of such shareholders."48 But the presumption
could be rebutted by a showing that the maj ority was a group that had interests adverse to
the corporation as a whole.
All of these cases presupposed an active judiciary that would evaluate business
decisions on a fact-specific basis. Berle looked to a principles-based rather than rulesbased jurisprudence. His remarks on the law of preemptive rights reflected his view of
corporate law generally:
The only conclusion that can be drawn from the tangled history of preemptive
rights is that the doctrine arose from an attempt to impose an equitable
limitation on an apparently absolute power of directors to issue stock; that it
should never have hardened into a rigid rule of law, and that it should revert to
its original status as a remedy, available in equity and possibly, by

42. Jd. at 1066-74.
43. Jd. at 1049.
44. Jd. at 1050-60.
45. Berle, Powers in Trust, supra note 7, at 1060-63. Examples of this include Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W.
668 (Mich. 1919), where the Ford board withheld dividends purportedly to share the wealth the company had
created with its customers rather than its stock owners, or, more starkly, when the father-owner of a close
corporation withheld dividends to discipline his family.
46. Berle, Powers in Trust, supra note 7, at 1063-66. Thus, a cross-stock ownership scheme between the
Prudential and Fidelity corporations that was implemented for the purpose of management entrenchment was
struck down. Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 53 A. 842 (N.J. Ch. 1903).
47. Berle, Powers in Trust, supra note 7, at 1066-69.
48 Jd. at 1067.
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transposition, at law. 49
Berle summed up with a two-prong test to assess the legitimacy of actions taken by
managers: first, whether the technical power for the action existed, and second, whether
the action was consistent with the managers' role as a fiduciary to the shareholders. 50 The
latter prong was to be guided by the analogous rules of trust law. 51 This logic of the
proposed test resonates in modern Delaware corporation law, which also looks first for
power to act and thereafter asks whether the fiduciary duty to act in the interest of the
shareholders has been violated. 52 Delaware also imposes special duties on controlling
shareholders, but the resemblance occurs only at this high level of generality. Berle's
article also evinces his deep distrust of managers and his belief that their power needed
some form of significant, substantive constraint. Here, Powers in Trust loses its
resonance with today's Delaware jurisprudence even as it can be tied to the line of
contemporary corporate legal theory stressing shareholder primacy. 53 Berle would
continue to distrust managers and advocate their constraint for the rest of his career. But
that distrust would very soon reconstitute itself in a form utterly alien to today's
advocates of shareholder primacy.

B. Middle Berle: The New Deal and Corporatism
Thus did Berle make his mark as a corporate law academic in 1931. He also had an
interest in national policy issues. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, still in
preparation, would synthesize both areas of interest. Before turning to that text, we follow
Berle, the public intellectual, to the national political stage.
Governor Franklin Roosevelt reached out to academics for assistance with policy
positions early in his 1932 presidential campaign. Roosevelt recruited Raymond Moley, a
government professor at Columbia. Moley then recruited Berle for expertise on credit and
corporations along with a Columbia economics professor, Rexford Tugwell, for expertise
on agriculture. Together they made up the core of what came to be called Roosevelt's
"Brains Trust.,,54

49. Id. at 1050-59.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. The requirement of power to act follows from Delaware General Corporation Law sections 141(a) and
142(a). The former section vests management authority in the board of directors and the latter section mandates
the appointment of officers to execute the board's business decisions. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a),
142(a) (2001 & Supp. 2006). Formal approval and delegation must occur case by case. Subsequent fiduciary
scrutiny follows from section 144 and the common law. See id. § 144 (providing for scrutiny of conflict of
interest transactions); see also id. § 102(b)(7) (permitting opting out in limited circumstances).
53. Berle's positions would echo strongly for the rest of the twentieth century in academic work
advocating a more restrictive fiduciary regime than that imposed by Delaware. See, e.g., William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (suggesting federal
intervention in formulating fiduciary standards); Marvin A. Chirelstein, Towards a Federal Fiduciary
Standards Act, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 203 (1981) (discussing whether Congress should act in the field of
managerial conduct and arguing that the idea of federal legislation is instrumental in solving fiduciary
problems).
54. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 70-73.
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I. The "New Individualism"
Berle sketched out his position even before joining the campaign, pitching it to
Louis Brandeis in a letter dated February 22, 1932. 55 Brandeis was a prominent "New
Freedom" progressive who advocated aggressive antitrust enforcement for the restoration
of market competition, prohibition of unfair trade practices, and protection for small
business. 56 Berle, in contrast, thought market competition was part of the problem.
Although corporate concentration had gone too far, he wrote, the antitrust platform did
not provide a viable approach to the economic crisis of 1932. 57 Better to accept the large
economic units and mold them so as to make them useful to the people. State capitalist
planning could address the economic crisis even as the individual was protected.
Once inside the campaign, Berle promptly set out these ideas in a memorandum to
Roosevelt entitled The Nature of the Difficulty.58 Success with Roosevelt was by no
means guaranteed. Although Maley and Tugwell were of one mind with BerIe,59
Roosevelt liked to surround himself with advisors espousing competing positions. One
such advisor was Felix Frankfurter, an old nemesis of BerIe's, 60 who, along with a cadre
of acolytes, still hewed to the economic liberalism of decades before. 6 I
BerIe's star ascended, however, and he received the go-ahead from Roosevelt to
draft a campaign speech that would represent a philosophical statement of the candidate's
economic policy. The speech, New Individualism, was delivered by Roosevelt on
September 23, 1932 to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, a prestigious club of
nonpartisan individuals interested in matters of government. 62 The speech-by all
accounts the most radical of FDR's campaign 63-was received tepidly, if not with some
hostility.64 It has since received a good deal of attention among political scientists, even
making a list of the 100 most important political speeches in American history.65 The
speech naturally did not carty BerIe's signature, but it is generally agreed that BerIe (and

55. Id. at 74-75.
56. See DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL
RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 65 (1988) (summarizing the political agenda of New Freedom progressives).
57. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 74-75

58. Id.
59. See BRAND, supra note 56, at 74-79 (summarizing Moley and Tugwell's economic and political
stance).
60. It might be more accurate to say that Berle was an old nemesis of Frankfurter's. Berle had Frankfurter
as a teacher during his first year at Harvard Law School and reportedly harassed Frankfurter rudely and
mercilessly during their class sessions. Frankfurter was rumored to have played a role in Berle's not being
invited to join the Harvard Law Review after his second year. Although Berle's grades were higher than those
of some who made the Review in that second round, his biographer sees no reason to infer professorial
interference, suggesting that Berle had been as unpopular with his classmates as he had been with his
professors. See SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 14-15.
61. Id. at 76.
62. Id. at 78.
63. Id. at 79; Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Address Before the Commonwealth Club (Sept. 23, 1932),
available at http://www.americanrhetoric.comlspeeches/fdrcommonwealth.htm [hereinafter Roosevelt,
Address] (containing the text of the speech).
64. Davis W. Houck, FDR's Commonwealth Club Address: Redefining Individualism, Adjudicating
Greatness, 7 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 259, 262 (2004).
65. It ranked 78th. See University of Wisconsin-Madison, Top 100 American Speeches of the 20th
CentuJy, http://www.news.wisc.edu/misc/speeches.
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his wife Beatrice) wrote it and that Roosevelt accepted it with very minor changes. 66 It is
also agreed that the speech in fact represented its author's views and presaged the
economic program of the New Deal. That the speech may not have represented
Roosevelt's views is less important for our purposes.
The "new individuals" of the speech were ordinary citizens. They had economic
rights-the right to make a comfortable living and the right to own property. Those rights
needed to be protected in order to ensure the safety of savings. 67 The parties infringing
the rights were corporate managers, the "princes of property,"68 who exercised "powers
in trust.,,69 Note that the text at this point diverges from the shareholder primacy of
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust. Even as the phrase "princes of property" bespeaks
concern about management power, Berle displaced the shareholder as his trust
beneficiary with the "new individuals." That accomplished, Berle reached the punch line:
private property rights would need to give way in the face of the public interest. Where a
year and half earlier the managers' private economic power had implied a private trust,
the implied trust was now public.
The speech went on to call for government controls. Continued sufferance of
management power depended on the trust's fulfillment: the "princes of property" had to
assume responsibility for the public good, end their internecine disputes, come together
as industrial groups, and cooperate toward a common end. Should any such group defect
from cooperation, the governmept would intervene with punishment. 70 Thus coordinated,
firms could serve the people-adjusting production to consumption and distributing
wealth more equitably.?1 The chaotic marketplace would be disciplined by "an economic
constitutional order."n Said Berle: "The day of the manager has come.,,73.
Although that last point was debatable, Roosevelt's day would come soon enough
and the New Individualism would find its way into public policy. Berle used "new"
individualism to contrast with the "old" individualism of Frankfurter and the other New
Freedom progressives and its stress on small business and strict antitrust enforcement. 74
"Collectivism" was the more common term at the time.?5 We prefer the more precise
term "corporatism."76 Corporatist policies had been debated in European political circles

66. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 78.
67. BERLE, RAPIDS, supra note 35, at 69.
68. Id.
69. See Berle, Powers in Tn/st, supra note 7 (summarizing powers in trust exercised by corporate

managers).
70. BERLE, RAPIDS, supra note 35, at 69.
71. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 78-79.
72. BERLE, RAPIDS, supra note 35, at 67.
73. Id.

74. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 78.
75. Jd. at 79 (quoting Tugwell); see also ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
MONOPOLY 35 (1966) (commenting on the emergence ofa "cooperative collectivist democracy" as one of three
schools of thought in the political struggle of the NIRA period). Schwarz describes Berle's approach in two
conjoined phrases: "state capitalism" and "corporate liberalism." SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 68.
"Corporatism" effectively merges the two.
76. We do not claim an original observation. Roberta Romano also interprets BerIe as a corporatist.
Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 936 (1984); see also Wells,
supra note 4, at 103-04 (explaining that Berle's 1950s vision of society based on the corporation was a variant
of corporatism).
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and had impacted European government policy since the late nineteenth century. They
came to the fore of policy discussions in the United States in the early 1930s as the depth
of the economic crisis became apparent. Berle explained it as follows in a memorandum
to Roosevelt in the summer of 1932:
[1]t is necessary to do for this system what Bismarck did for the German system
in 1880, as result of conditions not unlike these.... Otherwise only one of two
results can occur. Either these handful of people who run the economic system
now will get together making an economic government which far outweighs in
importance the federal government; or in their struggles they will tear the
system to pieces. Neither alternative is sound national policy. 77
Berle's New Individualism speech thereafter brought corporatism to the forefront of
American electoral politics.
We acknowledge that the term corporatism is not well known in the United States.
Indeed, those who do know it tend to avoid it,78 no doubt due to its association with the
fascist politics of the European countries that formally adopted corporatism during the
1920s and 1930s.7 9 But those associations can be put aside here, not only as regards the
context of 1932, but as regards the views Berle expressed for the remainder of his career.
At the same time, we make only a limited descriptive claim for corporatism. We use it as
a heuristic for the texts under discussion and for one subset of New Deal legislation. 80
Thus employed, it highlights the magnitude of the conceptual gulf that separates what
Berle, Means, and Dodd talked about from what we talk about today. Corporatism does
We also note that Berle has been characterized as a "pluralist." See Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to
Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 179,
185-94 (2005) (arguing that Berle and Means helped re-shape a legal pluralist vision of the modem state in
their collaborative work during the 1920s and 1930s). Tsuk situates Berle by reference to early twentiethcentury political theorists she terms "legal pluralists." Id, We have no quarrel with her description of the ideas
in circulation and their application to Berle, but we think the term corporatism and the associated bundle of
concepts describe him better. We also think that the transition from Early to Middle Berle effected a break~
Early Berle was influenced by ideas descended from the European legal pluralists of the nineteenth century;
Middle Berle was not. For a description of the European legal pluralists, see Anna Di Robilant, Genealogies of
Soft Law, 54 AM. 1. COMPo L. 499, 527--45 (2006). See also Ernst, supra note 31, at 60-61 (describing grouporiented reformers of the early twentieth century as "liberal pluralists" and going on to distinguish within the
group industrial pluralists who favored contractual solutions among empowered groups without strong state
intervention from a more interventionist group oflegal realists). In Ernst's description, the legal realists differed
one from the other depending on their willingness to tum away their critical eyes and back the social welfare
formulations of an interventionist state. Jd. at 69-71. Early Berle can be associated with the former subgroup,
see supra Part II.A., while Middle Berle's affinities lay strongly with the latter subgroup, in particular, Thurman
Arnold (prior to his entry into government). Ernst, supra note 31, at 90-97.
77. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 78.
78. A leading historian of the New Deal describes the early New Deal corporatists as, alternatively,
advocates of a vision of a "business commonwealth" and advocates of a "cooperative, collectivist democracy."
See HAWLEY, supra note 75, at 35 (outlining the two alternative ideologies as part of a three-cornered system
that also included the old, established market-driven ideology).
79. The first full adoption of a corporatist policy was in Benito Mussolini's Italy in 1922, with a few other
European countries following suit during the 1920s. HOWARD 1. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE
POLITICS 40 (1997).
80. We do not claim that the New Deal was broadly corporatist. New Deal policies and legislation
developed in reaction to events and drew on a range of ideologies. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC
CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN APROGRESSIVE AGE 409-12 (1998) (referring to Italian corporatism).
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this particularly well precisely because its operative concepts fell from favor in this
country in the wake of pluralism's triumph after World War II. It also facilitates
explication of the texts without an unnecessary diversion of attention to the nuances of
early twentieth century political-economic thinking. The next subsection sets out our
descriptive template.

2. Corporatist Theory
As described by one commentator, corporatism 81 is one of the three great "isms" of
the twentieth century, along with Marxism and liberal pluralism. 82 Although pure forms
of any of the three movements do not exist, pure forms serve as useful reference points.
In terms of jurisprudence, the three can be differentiated in terms of two core questions:
l) who is enfranchised and thus able to address the sovereign, and 2) whose preferences
count when the sovereign makes its policy decisions?
Liberal pluralism stands at the individualist extreme. Here, only the preferences of
individuals in their role as citizens get counted in the welfare calculus of government
policy. Policy outcomes are determined by competition for the votes of individuals in a
political marketplace. While individuals with shared interests form advocacy groups to
compete for favorable policy outcomes, the interest groups themselves have no political
status beyond the aggregation of their members' interests. Although corporations, unions,
and interest groups count and express their official views, they count only to the extent
that they offer informed judgments, political donations, or control votes. Communism
stands at the opposite, collectivist extreme. Here, only the party gets to address the state,
and only its preferences matter. Firms and unions are instruments to carry out the party's
political agenda. Advocacy groups keep a low profile if they exist at all. The people's
democracies are democracies only in the sense that the party claims knowledge of what
the people should want.
Corporatism stands between the two extremes with a more complex structure. The
pivotal distinction between corporatism and pluralism is that in corporatism, groups are
enfranchised as well as individuals. 83 An individual who belongs to a group in a sense
gets two votes, with group participation being the more important of the two. Individuals
are identified by their group, whether it be their parish, occupational association, industry
association, or union organization. 84 The groups then operate as the political actors.
Rather than one person-one vote, it is the groups' votes that determine government
policy, with the more powerful groups having the most votes. 85 Those outside the shield
of a recognized negotiating group have only "the devalued currency of electoral
representation,"86 to use one commentator's words.
Corporatism emphasizes cooperative relationships among groups and between the
state and the different groups. This is based on two principles. The first is the conception

81. This Article's presentation of corporatist theory and the failure of the National Industrial Recovery Act
draws on Wachter. See generally Wachter, supra note 14.
82. WIARDA, supra note 79, at 5.
83. ALAN CAWSON, CORPORATISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 145 (1986).
84. WIARDA, supra note 79, at 18.
85. Id.
86. CAWSON, supra note 83, at 145.
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of some sort of objectively cognizable "public interest" articulated by the government
with consultation from the major groups. Once the public interest is expressed, the
various groups are expected to adapt their policies so as to support it. 87 In Berle's New
Individualism variant, the public interest is described in terms of the economic rights of
individuals. 88
The number of groups with access to the state is limited in corporatism. Where
pluralism envisions an unlimited number of interest groups acting as extensions of many
atomistic actors and operating in a competitive political marketplace, corporatist theory
sees a limited number of groups, each wielding substantial political power. 89 Groups are
assembled into hierarchies, and the "peak associations" at the top hold the most influence
with government policymakers. The peak associations are groups like industry-wide
business associations or national labor federations whose broad membership is thought to
discourage narrow conceptions of political interest.
To function properly, corporatism requires group discipline. The peak groups are
expected to exert discipline among their constituent local groups so as to maintain
cohesive support for national policies. With that accomplished, the peak associations then
battle with or serve as counterweights to rival peak associations. For example, union
federations are pivotal because they offer a counterweight to the largest corporations,
perhaps the most powerful of the peak associations.
While Berle did not stress corporatist modes of political organization, he otherwise
fully embraced the corporatist vision, most notably the emphasis on government
management of the economy. Corporatism views free competition as a destructive force
that has to be both controlled and channeled through institutions that practice fair, but not
free, competition under the watchful, mediating power of the government. In
corporatism, fair competition means the "stabilization of business" with prices at levels
that simultaneously assure fair wages, yield an adequate return on invested capital, and
support high levels of employment. 90 Berle would stress these points during the 1932
campaign, the early New Deal, and for the rest of his academic career.
3. Berle's Corporatism in Practice: The National Industrial Recovery Act.

Berle continued to promote the corporatist program in public venues after Roosevelt
won the election. 91 He also kept it on the inner circle's agenda during the transition
period, generating a legislative research file on antecedent stabilization regimes 92 and, in
a memorandum sketching the terms of statutes to be enacted immediately after the
inauguration, a brief description of possible legislation. 93 A statute did follow during the

87. HARMON ZEIGLER, PLURALISM, CORPORATISM, AND CONFUCIANISM 22-23 (1988).
88. Roosevelt, Address, supra note 63.
89. CAWSON, supra note 83, at 35.
90. HAWLEY, supra note 75, at 14,26-27 (describing the aspirations of the NIRA's creators).
91. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 84--85.
92. The United States had experimented with corporatism in order to mobilize the country to fight the
Great War. With the War Industries Board, President Wilson established an "essentially corporatist, tripartite
(business, labor, and the state) arrangement to protect against strikes during the war, and to ensure the necessary
massive and uninterrupted production." WIARD A, supra note 79, at 135.
93. BERLE, RAPIDS, supra note 35, at 78-79. It would not rise to priority on the new administration's
agenda until after the first month however. See HAWLEY, supra note 75, at 21-22 (stating that "the new
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Hundred Days-the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).94 Berle did not, however,
participate in its preparation. He had chosen to stay in New York, declining a seat on the
Federal Trade Commission. 95 Moley and Tugwell-who had both accepted posts in the
Administration-served on a drafting team. Roosevelt, pursuant to his usual practice,
commissioned a competing draft, in this case from Senator Robert Wagner, whose team
included Jerome Frank. 96 The two groups hammered out the final draft in a locked door
session on May 10, 1933. The statute, passed by the Congress in June, represented the
adoption of corporatism by the United States. 97 It was the centerpiece of the First New
Deal.
The NlRA was administered by the National Recovery Administration (NRA). Like
Bede, the NRA's leaders were committed corporatists who sought to replace a perceived
individualistic, selfish, hyper-competitive system with a system built around concerted
activity under government supervision. Also like Bede,98 the first head of the NRA,
General Hugh Johnson, believed that capitalism had brought the United States to the
brink of collapse. 99
At the core of the NIRA were codes of fair competition for individual industries.
Trade associations, as the hierarchical peak groups for business, could ask that the federal
government approve codes of practices for their industries. 100 The codes, once approved
by the NRA, were legally binding on all the firms in the industry. If the trade association
proved reluctant to come forth with a code, the NRA could adopt one for it. 101
The codes offered business firms an unusual plum, namely, legalized concert of
action as a way out of the disastrous price cutting that had led to alarming numbers of
bankruptcies. In short order most of the major industries were covered by codes. The
companies that belonged to associations with approved codes were allowed to display the
Blue Eagle symbol, which publicly advertised their good standing with the NRA. 102
The NIRA held out an even bigger plum for one of its major beneficiaries-the
unions. At the start of the New Deal, labor was largely unorganized, weak, and entirely
unable to serve the functions required for the business-labor cooperation envisioned by
the NIRA. NIRA section 7(a) provided a new platform, augmenting the previously

Administration had no plans for broad changes in the business structure").
94. National Industry Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933).
95. He took a position as a counsel to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. SCHWARZ, supra note 21,
at 68.
96. The drafting teams encompassed an array of competing interests, including business. The bill emerged
as a compromise, holding out items for all and leaving much open to later administration. HAWLEY, supra note
75, at 19-26.
97. It was recognized at the time as drawing from the models being created in Europe. BRAND, supra note
56, at 83-85. In addition to the NIRA, the Robinson-Patman Act (1936), the Davis-Bacon Act (1931), the
Miller-Tydings Act (1937), as well as state and local price-maintenance laws, were elements of the move
toward a corporatist economy.
98. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 87.
99. BRAND, supra note 56, at 99-100.
100. National Industry Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3,48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933) (invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935» ("Upon the application to the President by one or more
industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or
industry ....").
10 I. BRAND, supra note 56, at 235.
102. ld. at 94.

116

The Journal ofCorporation Law

[Vol. 34:1

acknowledged right of labor to organize l03 with the right to do so free from interference
by employers. 104 In addition, the industry codes, before being approved "had to meet
specific conditions regarding the rights of employees to participate in union activities and
requirements of employers to comply with maximum work hours and minimum rates of
pay."105
The NIRA got off to a fast start, but it fell apart almost as quickly.106 The
cooperative alliances to which it looked never fully coalesced. Absent cooperation, its
economic plan foundered on internal contradictions. The NIRA leadership wanted a
system where, "fundamentally decent businessmen would not be forced by competitive
pressures to exploit their employees."107 For the system to succeed, unions and
businesses had to exercise self-restraint in their bargaining demands and be responsible
by supporting national priorities over their own priorities. This did not happen. 108 Neither
management nor labor was willing to play within the new corporatist structure. Strikes
and lockouts spread. 109 Corporations were unconvinced that the relaxation of the antitrust
laws was sufficient to compensate for the cost of Section 7(a). Union leaders were in a
similar position as members' aspirations and militancy increased along with workers'
new organizational rights. And unions, more than business, were willing to gamble that
the National Labor Board or the President himself would intervene and support their
claims in order to restore labor peace. 110
The new social ethic propagated by the system had not caught on. Nor did the
organizational hierarchies envisioned by the corporatist theory appear in practice. Neither
the Chamber of Commerce nor the AFL could successfully force member firms or union
locals to bring their goals in line with the Roosevelt Administration's public policy goals.
Nor is it clear that they ever tried to rally their troops. I 11

103. Roos explained that underNlRA section 7(a):
[E]mployees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of
labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
CHARLES F. Raos, NRA ECONOMIC PLANNING 484 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1937).
104. The exact scope of the right to be free from interference was never clarified, but it did provide the
basis for limiting the employer's right to hire and fire based on an employee's interest in unionization. BRAND,
supra note 56, at 230.
lOS. FREDERICK E. HOSEN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL 194 (1992).
106. In the rush to implement, the original drafting of the NlRA was left to Brain Trusters and progressive
politicians with little input from business or labor. See BRAND, supra note 56, at 83-86 (describing the drafting
of the NIRA).
107. Jd. at 12.
108. Jd. at 94 (noting that the Great Depression did not elicit the "level of virtuous self-restraint" necessary
for NRA compliance).
109. There were numerous union organizing and bargaining conflicts with businesses that required the
mediating skills of the NIRA leadership and often Roosevelt himself. See FOSTER RHEA DULLES, LABOR IN
AMERICA 271-72 (3d. ed. 1966) (describing the precipitous increase in strikes under the NlRA as workers
fought for higher wages and union recognition).
110. BRAND, supra note 56, at 258-59.
III. Henry Harriman, president of the Chamber of Commerce, claimed in May of 1933 that the NlRA was
the "Magna Carta of Industry and Labor" and his legal staff would immediately begin drafting a model code of
fair competition. Roas, supra note 103, at 43. However, by November of 1933 the Chamber had become
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Eventually, the NlRA's political base became unstable. It had rested on an alliance
of New Deal corporatists and antitrusters. 112 Both shared a common belief that the free
enterprise system had failed, but both, as we have seen, went on to offer diametrically
opposed solutions. While the antitrusters supported the wage increases newly organized
workers were winning, they were upset with the price increases that were necessary to
cover the cost of the increased wage. 113 Reflecting these internal contradictions,
antitrusters in Congress began to challenge the codes' price fixing practices as illegal
under prevailing law. 114
The NlRA, in sum, was terminal even before it was put to rest by the Supreme Court
in Schechter. 115 But corporatism did not die with it. Full-blown corporatist policies
returned with World War II in response to the need for increases in production of war
machinery. Given the exigencies of the war, Roosevelt replaced the soft sanctions of the
NlRA with heavy-handed, authoritarian sanctions. The war policies included wage and
price controls and a low tolerance for even lawful work stoppages by unions. When
dispute resolution failed, the government had a new policy option to help the parties
resolve their disputes: executive orders allowing the government to seize companies.
During the war, there were no fewer than 18 executive orders involving labor regulation,
and all of the government's industrial seizures in this period were accomplished by
executive order. I 16 From 1941 to 1945, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman conducted 71
industrial seizures. I 17
Berle himself outlined a number of dysfunctional aspects of the NRA' s operation in
a report he prepared for Hugh Johnson in July 1934. 118 He viewed the NlRA as an
experiment and accepted its failure, observing years later that intervention on such a scale
occurred in this country only in response to an emergency. I 19 But, as we will see, he
never abandoned corporatism's underlying economic and political assumptions.

concerned with the level of government involvement in industry regulation and by May 1935 had "publicly
declared war on the New Deal." BRAND, supra note 56, at 140, 284.
112. See BRAND, supra note 56, at 128~29 (discussing the development of the NRA).
113. For an excellent discussion of the stresses in the progressive movement as it tried to come to terms
with Roosevelt's corporatist economy, including its adherence to fair prices and acceptance of price fixing
under the sponsorship of government agencies, see Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement,
Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REv. lOll
(2005).
114. HAWLEY, supra note 75, at 89~90.
115. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). In Schechter, the Court held
that the code-making authority conferred by the NIRA was an excessive delegation of legislative power and
therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 542. The Schechter Court's use of the nondelegation doctrine to overturn the
NIRA is now viewed as a "legal anachronism" because equally broad grants of authority to government
agencies have been consistently upheld since the New Deal. BRAND, supra note 56, at 291.
116. BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: WORLD WAR II AND THE AMERICAN STATE
73-74 (1996).
117. Id. at 73. In fact, the number of seizures increased during each year of the war, and peaked in fiscal
years 1944 and 1945.Id. at 86. Of the top 100 American corporations, more than one-third were seized either in
whole or in part. Id. at 73 n.13. Among those seized were railroads, coal mines, and even the Montgomery Ward
department store. GEOFFREY PERRETT, DAYS OF SADNESS, YEARS OF TRIUMPH 303 (1973).
118. BERLE, RAPIDS, supra note 35, at 99-101.
119. See BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 59.
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C. Summary
In April 1931, Berle made a case for shareholder primacy in a trust context on the
pages of the Harvard Law Review. In so doing he abandoned his earlier contract-centered
views on solutions to corporate problems. The shift stemmed from concern about
growing corporate power. But the context remained that of his earlier writing-eorporate
law, narrowly conceived. By September 1932, Berle had transformed his trust model for
the national political economy. As restated in the New Individualism speech, management
was to act in the public interest. The shareholder beneficiary was nowhere to be seen. The
context was different, of course. Where Early Berle addressed only corporate law issues,
Middle Berle articulated national public policy. We are nonetheless left with two
apparently inconsistent Berles. We can bring them closer together, if not merge them into
a coherent whole, by reference to The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
published in August 1932. 120
III. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
The Modern Corporation and Private Property captures Berle in the I11.iddle of his
metamorphosis from friend of shareholders to advocate of the corporation as an
instrument for furthering national social welfare policy. The book thus provides a
window into the evolution of his thinking. Unsurprisingly, the transition has some
awkward junctures.
The Modern Corporation stood for the same proposition as Powers in Trust-that
something had to be done about management power. 121 But Powers in Trust remained in
shareholder primacy mode as it argued that the powers of the new management class had
to be exercised for the benefit of the shareholders, with no hint of higher corporatist
constraints. Berle carried that point over to The Modern Corporation and expanded on it.
Indeed, most of the book's chapters proceed in the mode of Powers in Trust, wjth
Chapter VII of Book II lifted almost in its entirety from the article and reprinted without
citation. 122
At the same time, The Modern Corporation sandwiched its expanded discussion of
the shareholder trust model between introductory and concluding chapters that offered a
more general discussion of the sources and implications of corporate power. This
exposition, although still largely articulated within a narrow corporate law framework,
laid theoretical groundwork for both Roosevelt's New Individualism and the NIRA.
The book made a series of positive assertions about the wider political economy, all
grolmded in Means' numbers. Economic power was becoming concentrated in the hands
of a cluster of corporate managers. The corporate system had developed certain
significant attributes and powers, and it now amounted to a major social institution. 123

120. The book was originally published by the Corporation Clearing House, a subsidiary of the Corporation
Trust Company. Apparently some of the Corporation Trust Company's affiliates expressed displeasure over the
book, and an agreement was quickly struck with MacMillan to become the publisher. BERLE, RAPIDS supra note
35, at 21-22; Berle, Modern Functions, supra note 16, at 434.
121. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10; Berle, Powers in Trust, supra note 7.
122. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 247-76; Berle, Powers in Trust, supra note 7. We note that
Powers in Trust in tum may have been lifted from the book manuscript.
123. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 1.
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Individual property had gone into a "collective hopper" which had brought forth huge
industrial 0ligarchies. 124 The oligarchs exercised unified control over the wealth under
their charge. If Means' predictions were accurate, the industrializing American economy
could not possibly operate competitively. Each market would be dominated by only a few
firms.
The Modern Corporation took pains to underscore the role corporate law played in
investing this economic and social power. 125 The law had taken on this role
inadvertently, based on a set of assumptions shared with classical economics. Under the
shared, nineteenth century vision, production and trade were usually conducted by selfemployed individuals. 126 Corporate production was an exception limited to special
situations. Limitations on corporate authority were thought inevitably to accompany that
special status and corporate law was thought the appropriate means of limitation. 127 But
corporate law had stopped placing limits on corporate operations during the course of the
nineteenth century. It had done so to facilitate the appearance and success of the large,
mass-producing, management-controlled corporation. As the book noted, the change had
been reactive rather than purposive-an acknowledgement of underlying economic
facts. 128 Despite this, the transition from the classical econo~y implicated the law in the
creation and perpetuation of an unsatisfactory situation.
In the classical model, profit-maximizing individual entrepreneurs both own the
means of production and make all decisions respecting production and consumption.
Power relations are bilateral: one actor can affect another's behavior only indirectly, by
refusing to contract. The result is market competition that effectively controls the
producers, constraining both the incompetent and the greedy and legitimating private
economic power. But, argued Berle and Means in The Modern Corporation, corporate
mass production on a large capital base does not fit within the classical model's
legitimating parameters. 129 As the book pointed out, the big corporations of the twentieth
century had split the classical entrepreneurial function between salaried executives who
sat atop hierarchical organizations, and anonymous equity participants who held small
stakes and prize market liquidity over participation. With control and ownership
separated, managers were newly empowered. The interests of the owners and managers
often diverged, while many "checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power"
had disappeared. 130 Problems not only of competence but of responsibility followed,
problems largely absent in an ideal capitalist world inhabited by self-employed individual
producers. 131
Consequently, what Berle had once seen as a problem for private actors in the world
of finance now came to be seen as a problem for government. 132 The collective aspect of
corporate production implied that standard individualist defenses against government

124. Jd. at v.
125. Jd.at2,141.

126. Jd.at1,4.
Jd. at 13-35.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 141.
Jd. at 345-51.
Jd. at 6.
Jd. at 1-9.
132. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 56.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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intervention no longer applied. 133 Moreover, the separation of ownership and control had
a further positive implication-corporate property should no longer be deemed private
propeliy: "It is entirely possible and some students of the situation are beginning to
contend, that the corporate profit stream in reality no longer is private property, and that
claims on it must be adjusted by some test, other than that of property right." 134 With this
transformation of corporate profits from purely private property to property touched with
a public interest, The Modern Corporation intersects core corporatist theory. Berle could
have had the New Individualism and the NlRA in mind with a follow up point (save for
the emphasis on judicial enforcement): "[P]rivate property may one day cease to be the
basic concept in terms of which the courts handle problems of large scale enterprise and
that the corporate mechanism may prove the very means through which such
modification is brought about."135
These prescriptive projections earned The Modern Corporation high regard in New
Deal circles. Time magazine would label it "the economic Bible of the Roosevelt
administration" one year after its publication. 136 With the economy in severe crisis, it
was reasonable to conclude that free competition carried with it a destructive curse.
Something needed to be done to make free competition less threatening and The Modern
Corporation cleared the path of free market objections.
The book otherwise had little to offer New Deal legal reformers. It nowhere
recommended a pervasive system of government oversight, corporatist or otherwise. The
reference to the "princes of property" in the New Individualism speech drew on rhetoric
familiar to readers of The Modern Corporation, which referred to "princes of industry."
But the book coined the phrase without setting out any implications: they were "princes
of industry, whose position in the community has yet to be defined."137 Berle reserved
his definitional follow-through for the political sphere.
The book did not even suggest much in the way of corporate law reform. While it
treated securities underwriting and trading in detail, describing the prevailing legal
framework and predicting new regulation in the future; it made no specific
suggestions. 138 Such new law as the book advocated followed from the trust model and
shareholder primacy: state-level common law directed to the problem of management
self-dealing. But equivocation showed up even here. On the one hand, the enforcement of
the equitable limitation to exercise power for the shareholders' benefit could be safely
remitted to the judiciary in theory, the common law of fiduciary duties being the only
area of corporate law that had not undergone a steady weakening process due to charter
133. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 345-51.
134. Id. at 247. Here they reflect the thinking of their Columbia colleague, Robert Hale, who thought all
private property amounted to a delegation of public authority to exclude others from its use. ROBERT L. HALE,
FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING LAW 366--79 (1952). The public aspects
of private property were, more generally, discussed in a variety of regulatory and theoretical contexts at the
time. For discussion of these regulatory and theoretical contexts, see BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSNE
ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAlRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 107, 169-75
(1998).
135. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 247.
136. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. LJ. 1593, 1685
(1988).
137. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 2.
138. ld. at 289-331.
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competitIOn. "Flexible and realistic" judges, "if untrammeled by statute," could be
expected to find solutions to problems that demanded a remedy. 139 On the other hand, it
was by no means certain that courts would adopt the theory. Only an "expert and
courageous court [would] apply this theory to most of the corporate problems reaching
litigation.,,140 Thus the position of shareholders in large corporations remained perilous.
"In fact, if not in law, at the moment we are thrown back on the obvious conclusion that a
stockholder's right lies in the expectation of fair dealing rather than in the ability to
enforce a series of supposed legal claims."141
Had the book closed with this appeal for a shareholder trust model, it could stand
today as an historical monument to shareholder primacy, however far ranging its
discussion of the social and economic problems posed by management power. But Berle
himself prevented that result by stating the opposite position in The Modern
Corporation's final chapter, six pages entitled ''The New Concept of the Corporation."142
There Middle Berle finally appears fully formed. Breaking sharply with shareholder
primacy, he redeploys the trust model for the beneficiaries of the New individualism
speech: since the shareholders had given up responsibility for corporate property, other
constituents should join them as corporate beneficiaries; the "[r]igid enforcement of
property rights" of passive shareholders would give way in the face of a "convincing
system of community obligations."143 Management, moreover, must develop into a
"purely neutral technocracy."144 In meeting their obligations, corporate leaders would be
expected to "set forth a program comprising fair wages, security to employees,
reasonable service to their public, and stabilization of business." 145
In this new vision of the trust model, directors' primary allegiance was to the
national interest. Once a well-articulated public policy was established, the directors of
the corporation should help society achieve the articulated goals. At that point,
shareholders would have to take the back seat. Instead of unrestrained maximization,
directors were to maximize the value of the corporation in a way that satisfied societal
goals. Berle had become a corporatist.
Berle later would suggest that the last chapter was what the book was all about-a
few pages for the general reader "too lazy, busy or uninterested to read three hundred
pages of academic argument." 146 His concerns about the general reader are
understandable, but we wonder whether his comment also bespeaks recognition of a
compositional problem. Berle had started the book back in the 1920s as a corporate
lawyer's project, a study centered on the role of corporate law fiduciary duties in
controlling managerial excess. But his co-author's contribution had broader ranging, even
contradictory, implications. If Means was correct, the problem of corporate power could
139. Id. at
140. Id. at
141. Id.

221-22,335-36.
276

142. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 352-57.
143. Id. at 356.
144. Id. at 353-56.
145. Id. Berle did believe that shareholders remained the true owners (or at least residual claimants) of the
corporation. While Berle had few good words for absolutist corporate administrators, he had a soft spot for
shareholders, whom he identified with ordinary working people who needed to collect their dividend checks to
make ends meet. Berle, Trustees Note, supra note 9, at 1367-68.
146. SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 63.
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not be cabined in a shareholder trust model, and judicial intervention certainly would not
suffice as a remedy for the separation of ownership and control. We believe that Berle
suspected as much himself as he wrote the book, but had not yet worked out a
satisfactory, integrated approach. The last chapter's jump amounted to a temporary
patch. 147
Berle's published, public posture did not incorporate his shift to corporatism as the
book neared publication in August 1932. As we have seen, he had only recently staked
out a public claim for shareholder primacy in Powers in Trust, a position that stood in
tension with the book's more broad-ranging emphasis on the dangers of corporate power,
and directly contradicted the assertions in the last chapter. However, while Berle's public
face was one that today's shareholder primacy advocates would find attractive, the Berle
of mid-1932 was a corporatist.
It must thus have come as a rude and unwelcome shock to Berle when E. Merrick
Dodd, a Harvard Law professor, used the pages of the May 1932 Harvard Law Review to
respond to Powers in Trust a year after its publication. 148 Dodd attacked Berle's
shareholder primacy position,149 forcing Berle to defend an article and a position that he
himself had substantially modified and as he was about to publish a book that, somewhat
awkwardly, took both positions simultaneously. Even worse, Dodd attacked from a
corporatist position.
IV. THE BERLE-DODD DEBATE
To understand the Berle-Dodd debate is to see Berle and Dodd participating in a
national political discussion over the outlines of the new American corporatism. How
much should the United States' version of corporatism differ from that taken in many of
the European countries that were becoming (or had become) corporatist? This was the
key political issue at the time, and it was on this point that Berle and Dodd differed. The
question went to the allocation of power as between corporate managers and the state.
One faction, which Ellis Hawley describes as the advocates of a "business
commonwealth," wanted to delegate planning authority to industrialists themselves
(acting through trade associations), relegating government to a backstop, supporting
role. 150 The other faction, called the collectivist democrats or "planners" by Hawley, was
147. For a contrasting reading of the book, see Tsuk, supra note 17, at 1886-88. For Tsuk, the book
"announced that all [because ownership was separated from control] publicly held business corporations were
public trustees. Their power was to be exercised to satisfy the demands of the community." Id. at 1888. This is
an accurate characterization of the book's last chapter, but not of the book as a whole. We prefer to underscore
its internal tensions. Tsuk disposes of the shareholder primacy position stated in Berle's response to Dodd as
follows: "Berle himself seemed to have endorsed this position in a famous debate with E. Merrick Dodd...."
Tsuk, supra note 76, at 205. Tsuk, in effect, asserts that Berle's appearance in 1932 trumped the reality of
Berle's position. For this, she relies on the change of position announced by Berle in 1954. !d. at 206. We prefer
to describe Berle as an astute observer whose views evolve over time in reaction to events. In our view, these
conflicts~evident in Berle's 1932 publications~would be resolved by later events.
148. Dodd, Trustees, supra note 8.
149. Id.
150. See HAWLEY, supra note 75, at 36-43 ("[B]usiness leaders should be entrusted with governmental
powers and the making of economic decisions should be the exclusive prerogative of the managerial group.").
This group's operative ideas descended from the "associationist" movement of the 1920s~a small business
initiative geared toward protectionist trade associations and against antitrust. Big business co-opted the ideas
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SUSpICIOUS of business, questioned the empowerment of industrialists, and wanted
government to hold ultimate control. 151 There also was a subsidiary question. As we have
seen, corporatism seeks coherence by limiting the number of groups with access to the
state. The groups granted access come to the corporatist table wielding substantial
political power. But which groups? In the business commonwealth vision, the new
regime would admit only the corporate establishment to the table, respecting the
prevailing power structure. The planners, who followed a progressive political agenda,
included labor in the selection. 152
BerIe was a planner and a progressive, and so distrusted the managerial elite,153 or,
in his terms, the "princes of property." At the same time, as a progressive, he viewed
labor unions as a critical\ countervailing power against corporate management. In
economic terminology, the progressives' view of corporatism followed from a particular
view of society's welfare function. 154 That welfare function saw unions as a public good
and favored empowering the less well-off as against the "princes of property." It was this
progressive model of corporatism that BerIe brought to RooseveltDodd came to corporatism as a supporter of the business commonwealth. 155 We do
not know Dodd's political views directly since, unlike BerIe, he never became a public
figure and tended to restrict himself to doctrinal matters in his scholarship. 156 However,
in the debate with BerIe, Dodd develops his position by quoting liberally and favorably
from two public figures with known political positions on the business commonwealth
side-Owen D. Young, chairman of the General Electric Corporation (GE), and Gerald
Swope, GE's president. Young and Swope were leaders of the "New Capitalism,"157 the
name given to their policy of adopting what today would be considered modern
employment policies. In addition, Swope had formulated and promoted a plan for

after 1929 and took the politicallead.ld. at 39-41. Alan Brinkley describes associationism as follows:
Those who promoted the associational approach to economic reform ... were much less concerned
... about protecting capitalists from government. To them, the greater challenge was protecting the
business world from excessive competition.. . Like Europeans developing a rationale for
corporatist experiments in managing industrial economies, some Americans yearned for political
arrangements that could produce social and economic harmony.
ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 34-35 (1995).
151. HAWLEY, supra note 75, at 43-46.
152. Jd. at 45.
153. Jd. at 44.
154. The social welfare function provides an ordering of policy and alternative states of the world in terms
of their value to society. That is, the social welfare function embeds the articulated public policy goals that
corporate directors should pursue in addition to shareholder wealth.
155. In our analysis, Berle as a planner stands well to Dodd's left. This is in contrast to the accepted view
that Berle is the conservative because of his support of shareholder primacy, while Dodd is the more liberal
because of his support for corporate social responsibility. See Winkler, supra note 5 (discussing the political
learnings ofBerle and Dodd).
156. The one direct reference we have found to Dodd's political views is in an obituary appearing in the
Harvard Law Review. It states that "[h]is political and educational views were definitely on what would be
called the liberal side." Erwin N. Griswold, Edwin Merrick Dodd, 65 HARV. L. REV. 377,378 (1952). We do
not hazard a guess as to what constituted "the liberal side" of politics at Harvard Law School in the early 1950s.
157. See Edward A. Filene, The New Capitalism, in 149 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, PART I: THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 3-11
(1930) (discussing the evolution of "New Capitalism").
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confronting the economic crisis. Under this business commonwealth model, managers
would be accorded a crucial role in planning and allocational decision-making not only
within the firm, but within the national government. However, while activist Swope may
have been advocating changes in business policy, his bottom line was to maximize the
profits of the emerging modem GE.
The Berle-Dodd debate emerges as a clash between the different visions of
corporatism whose advocates were then vying to capture Roosevelt's attention. Berle,
vying directly as a member of the Brains Trust, ended up the political winner in 1933.
But the issues persisted in the wake of the failure of the NIRA and the debate did not end
in 1932. 158 Indeed, Dodd came back in 1935 to restate his case for management
discretion in a corporatist state in a riposte aimed at BerIe's instrumental case for the
shareholder interest. Then, in 1941, he came back yet again with an essay that abandoned
his previous positions. In this final appearance he stepped away from corporatism,
withdrew his support from management, and reinstated the shareholder as corporate law's
beneficiary, in effect ending up where Berle had started in 193 1..Not to be outdone, BerIe
himself revisited the debate in 1954, conceding that Dodd had been proven right. In our
reading, however, BerIe's concession only applied to the political and economic context
of 1954. As to the appropriate response to the crisis of 1932, he never for a second
questioned himself.
Section A explicates Dodd's attack and its corporatist foundations. Section B turns
to BerIe's first response, explaining the nuanced place it occupied in the politics of the
day. Section C takes up Dodd's rebuttal and reversal. Section D concludes with BerIe's
volte face. Section E summarizes the salient features of the BerIe-Dodd debate.

A. Dodd's Attack
Dodd's For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? started by paying brief
homage to BerIe's desire to constrain managers from transferring the assets of the
corporation to their own pocket. 159 But Dodd quickly switched to the attack, stating that
BerIe's shareholder trustee view was problematic because "it [wa]s undesirable ... to
give increased emphasis at the present time to the view that business corporations exist
for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders." 160 Instead, corporations
should act as social institutions. 161
Dodd believed, correctly, that corporatism was making its way across the Atlantic
and highlighted various constitutional and statutory foundations of corporatism already in
place, foundations with transforrnative implications for corporate law. He pointed to
Munn v. Illinois,162 an 1877 Supreme Court case which held that the state of Illinois had
the power to set maximum prices for grain storage because such enterprises were
158. Indeed, the corporatist planners' ascendancy in the Roosevelt administration would be short-lived.
After the failure of the NlRA, the New Freedom trust busters would gain the upper hand. See HAWLEY, supra
note 75, at 149-86, 325-43 (detailing the shift in thought in the aftermath of the NlRA).
159. See Dodd, Trustees, supra note 8, at 1147 ("The present writer is thoroughly in sympathy with Mr.
Berle's efforts to establish a legal control which will more effectually prevent corporate managers from
diverting profit into their own pockets from those of stockholders ....").
160. ld. at 1147-48.
161. Id. at 1148.
162. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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"affected with a public interest." 163 He believed that the rule of Munn could be broadly
extended: "[I]t may well be that the law is approaching a point of view which will regard
all business as affected with a public interest."164 Moreover, in the industries that were
already clearly affected with a public interest-the public utilities-corporatist-like
statutes had already been enacted. The Adamson Act,165 which covered the railroad
industry, was "a thinly disguised measure for increasing wages," and thus clearly an
example of workers' economic security taking precedence over shareholders' profit. 166
Dodd noted that "the more advanced states" had extended such legislation to other
utilities, such as gas, electric, and telephone. 167
Dodd believed that piecemeal adoption of corporatist policies would no longer
suffice-a more widespread reform was in the offing. "There is a widespread and
growing feeling that industry owes to its employees not merely the negative duties of
refraining from overworking or injuring them, but the affirmative duty of providing them
so far as possible with economic security.,,168
Dodd aligned himself with the business commonwealth camp. Supporting
corporatism, he noted:
is no longer confined to radical opponents of the capitalistic system; it has
come to be shared by many conservatives who believe that capitalism is worth
saving, but that it can not permanently survive under modem conditions unless
it treats the economic security of the worker as one of its obligations. 169
Dodd found support for this view in his colleague from across the Charles River, Wallace
Donham, Dean of the Harvard Business School, whom Dodd quotes as saying, '''[t]he
only way to defend capitalism is through leadership which accepts social responsibility
and meets the sound needs of the great majority ofourpeople.'''170
Dodd believed that the corporatist policy for the United States should be based on
the presumption that the managerial elite, given the appropriate mandate, would act as
trustees for the community and use their corporations to resolve the economic and social
problems of the Great Depression. ExtenSive regulation would be unnecessary, and "[t]he
principal object of legal compulsion might then be to keep those who failed to catch the
new spirit up to the standards which their more enlightened competitors would desire to
adopt voluntarily."171
Dodd professed the utmost faith in managers and their sense of professional
responsibility. He proclaimed that "[p]ower over the lives of others tends to create on the
part of those most worthy to exercise it a sense of responsibility." 172 He noted:

163. Ed. at 126.
164. Dodd, Trustees, supra note 8, at 1149. Dodd does acknowledge that decisions of the time like Tyson v.
Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927), pointed to the opposite direction.
165. The constitutionality of the Adamson Act, which mandated an eight-hour day and extra pay for
overtime, was sustained in Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
166. Dodd, Tn/stees, supra note 8, at 11 SO.
167. Id.at115l.
168. ld.
169. ld.
170. ld.

at 11 52.
at 1155-56 (quoting WALLACE DONHAM, BUSINESS ADRIFT 105-06 (1931».
171. Dodd, Trustees, supra note 8, at 1153.
172. Id. at 1157.
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[S]ome of our business leaders and students of business tell us, there is in fact a
growing feeling not only that business has responsibilities to the community
but that our corporate managers who control business should voluntarily and
without waiting for legal compulsion manage it in such a way as to fulfill those
responsibilities. 173
Such business leaders included the above-mentioned Young and Swope.
Dodd quoted Young and his constituency view of the corporation at length. Youn
"saw rising a notion that managers were no longer attorneys for stockholders; they wer
becoming trustees of an institution." 174 Young acknowledged that the Great Depressio
was an important element in this new view of the corporation as an institution that had t
serve not only the interests of its stockholders, but also the interest of its employees ant
customers. 175
Swope, as noted earlier, had actually disseminated a plan for economic recovery
known as the Swope Plan. The plan, which had received widespread media attention, hal
been unveiled in late September 1931 at the annual dinner of the National Electri<
Manufacturers' Association in New York. 176 It had manifest political implications. Thl
leading proponents of the plan, including Swope himself, had extensive politica
connections. Young, a strong plan supporter, was a speculative Democratic presidential
candidate. l77 So was Silas Strawn, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Strawn's successor, Henry Harriman also supported the plan. In fact, according tc
Hoover's memoirs, Harriman advised Hoover that if he did not support the plan, big
business would put its money and influence behind Roosevelt, who had purportedly
signed on. l78 For his part, Swope shopped the plan in Congress, testifying before
multiple committees, including Senator La Follette's hearing regarding the establishment
of a National Economic Council. 179
The business component of the plan was essentially the same as that of the later
NIRA mandated cartelization through trade associations supervised by the federal
government for the purpose of stabilizing prices and production. The labor component,
however, differed materially. The Swope Plan called for companies themselves to
establish and administer plans for workmen's compensation, life and disability insurance,
pensions, and unemployment. This paternalistic approach to worker welfare left all
aspects of the recovery program firmly in the hands of business and indeed was adopted
from policies already pursued by Young and Swope at GE. 180
173.
174.
175.
176.

ld. at 1153-54.
ld. at 1154.

Id.

Swope
Plan,
TIME,
Sept.
28,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0.9171 ,742325-1 ,00.html.

1931,

available

at

177. ld.

178. Harriman was a strong presence in shaping the NIRA. He submitted a plan of his own that was
considered by the NIRA drafters and participated in the business advisory group that consulted with the final
drafting committee. ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION:
BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, MID THE TRADE ASSOCIATIO ISSUE, 1921-1933, at 203,206 (2d ed. 1993) (1976).
179. Id. at 127, 131.
180. In this respect, the plan bore a strong resemblance to Bismarck's paternalistic attempts to quell
socialist stirrings in late nineteenth century Germany. Swope's father, Isaac Swope, emigrated from Germany in
1857. Gerard Swope was active in the German utilities market through his role as president of the International
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Although Swope does not appear to have taken an active part in drafting the NIRA,
it safely can be assumed that his plan, as a focal point proposal from the business side,
was among those reviewed by the two drafting committees during the Hundred Days.181
As we have seen, the statute that emerged gave considerable power to labor unions in
setting the recovery agenda by effectively forcing business to sit at the same negotiating
table. Big business was not pleased: the president of a leading trade association accused
Senator Wagner of betraying his business supporters by accepting the amendment that
added section 7a. 182
Dodd's approving discussion of Young and Swope has two implications. First, it
places Dodd firmly in the corporatist camp. As was recognized at the time, Swope and
Young were advocating a model of corporate activity that was very different from the
traditional one. The model centered on a corporatist tradeoff: corporations would give up
some portion of their market freedom in exchange for stability and relief from the
destructive swings of the business cycle. Second, it aligns Dodd with the business
commonwealth corporatists. Rather than view the "princes of property" with suspicion,
as Berle did, Dodd saw them as the solution to the nation's economic ills.
Significantly, this business commonwealth posture did not put Dodd at variance
with the goal of corporate profitability. The labor-management regime Swope 183 had
instituted at GE in the 1920s had indeed featured premium wages and benefits at levels
higher than necessary to clear GE's labor market. There had been no give-away,
however. Swope and Young broke with the old capitalism in supporting modem
employment policies. In their view, GE would have higher profits if it paid wages high
enough to reduce turnover to the point where it reduced unit labor costs. 184 In a 1927
speech to the Harvard School of Business Administration, Young stated that "[s]lowly we
are learning that low wages for labor do not necessarily mean high profits for capital." 185
Swope and Young were in the same mode when they accepted labor unions-they
thought unions were essential to maintaining a steady, productive work force, and they
feared that an alternative might be a radicalized workforce. 186

General Electric Company and later as president of GE.
181. Moley reviewed proposals emanating from the Chamber of Commerce; the Wagner draft centered on
industrial self-governance. HAWLEY, supra note 75, at 23, 25.
182. HIMMELBERG, supra note 178, at 207.
183. Outside of the business environment, Swope was a champion of the working poor. In his early career
days in Chicago, Swope worked at night as a volunteer at Hull House, teaching mathematics and electricity to
immigrant workingmen. His wife, Mary Hill was one of the social workers at the settlement. Jane Addams
performed the wedding ceremony. When the Swopes later moved to St. Louis, they bought adjacent houses in a
working-class neighborhood, living in one and making the other a settlement house where Mary Swope taught
immigrant women sewing. Ro ALD W. SCHATZ, THE ELECTRICAL WORKERS: A HISTORY OF LABOR AT
GE ERALELECTRIC AND WESTfNGHOUSE 1923-1960, at 14 (1983).
184. !d. at 16. In their top management positions at GE, Swope and Young knew that a stable, happy work
force was necessary in order to maximize company profits, and they took care to minimize conflicts between
workers and management. Young sought to create an environment in which workers felt that they had a stake in
the success or failure of the company, leading them to take pride in their work and enhancing productivity. Id.
185. Id. at 15.
186. Swope and Young sought friendly relations with union leaders, taking what could be characterized as
an "if you can't beat them, join them" approach. It was clear that socialism was gaining popularity among the
workers, and the push for union representation was strong. Kim McQuaid, Young, Swope and General
Electric's 'New Capitalism': A Study in Corporate Liberalism, 1920-1933,36 AM. 1. ECON. & SOC. 323,325
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GE, then, had been pursuing efficiency effects that more than covered t
incremental labor costs. The strategy had worked during the expansionary 1920s. But
left GE at a disadvantage against lower paying competitors during the Gn
Depression.1 87 The Swope Plan reflected GE's interests at the time, with its natior
product cartel, federal subsidies for employee benefits, and tax abatement for fin
vulnerable to competition from foreign firms with lower paid employees. 188 Even
Young and Swope talked constituent interests, there is no reason to believe that th
viewed themselves as defectors against the shareholders.
B. Berle's Response

We do not know whether Dodd, as he wrote For Whom Are Corporate ManagE
Trustees?, knew that Berle already had moved away from shareholder primacy to
contrasting corporatist position. If Dodd did know, his article makes for dout
interesting reading as an exemplar of strategic academic writing. 189
The attack gave Berle a jolt-a progressive planner who had taken pro-Iat
positions in his popular writing l90-he had not been expecting an attack on his corpon
law position from the other corporatist camp, 191 The problem was that Berle no lonE
wanted to defend shareholder primacy, at least not in a framework discussing t
corporation's role in the wider political economy. Nor was he keen to engage in a pub
debate about corporatism. We suspect he thought the timing was wrong. The bat
between his progressive vision of corporatism and business commonwealth corporati~
was taking place behind closed doors. Berle wanted to ensure his vision of corporatiE
was the one that would be adopted by the Roosevelt Administration and presumably w
jealous to protect his influence. We doubt that Berle's fellow Brains Trusters would ha
welcomed participation by one of their number in an open academic debate between t
progressive and the conservative supporters of corporatism. Roosevelt had not yet nodd
in their direction; the New Individualism speech still lay in the future. In any event, Bel
was unlikely to have seen the Harvard Law Review as an appropriate venue for
exposition of his full view. Although this was well enough formed for an FDR campai
speech, he may not have been ready for a structural exposition and defense in a leE
academic context.

(1977). The GE approach was to push for one industrial union rather than a splintering of craft unions. Wl
confronted with ambitious and successful union leaders, GE would offer them management positions.
In the early days of the union movement, such beliefs were reasonable. See Wachter, s~pra note 14
624-25 (noting the 1930s corporatist position of unions as a public good, and the subsequent decline in t
belief). The leadership that replaced Swope and Young viewed them as naive in their attitudes towards uni<
once it was clear that the union wage was above that paid by competing non-union firms. SCHATZ, supra n
183, at 170-71.
187. See PETER A. SWENSON, CAPITALISTS AGAINST MARKETS: THE MAKING OF LABOR MARKETS A
WELFARE STATES IN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN 63, 182-83, 195 (2002) (describing GE and
approach as "segmentalism").
188. Id. at 204.
189. Both texts read more coherently on the assumption that both authors understood all of the stakes.
190. See supra text accompanying note 32 (noting that Berle published short opinion pieces that specula
about worker ownership).
191. See SCHWARZ, supra note 21, at 65 (noting Dodd's critique of Berle's advocacy for corpor
liberalism as an alternative to socialism).
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Berle's answer to Dodd, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note,
appeared in the next issue of the Harvard Law Review. 1n It was a brief but forceful
counter-punch that avoided responding to Dodd's corporatism broadly, and focused only
on mechanics. Berle attacked the idea that managers could be trusted to use discretionary
power for the welfare of others as the naive and out-of-touch thinking of an ivory tower
academic. Berle caustically remarked that Dodd's argument "is theory, not practice" and
"[corporate lawyers] know what the social theorist does not.,,193 The key insight that
Berle attributed to these corporate lawyers is that a management-coordinated, multiple
constituency system simply would not work.
The problem was that unconstrained managers would maximize their own welfare.
Specifically: "[I]t must be conceded, at present, that relatively unbridled scope of
corporate management has, to date, brought forward in the main seizure of power without
recognition of responsibility-ambition without courage."194 The danger was that
"[w]hen the fiduciary obligation of the corporate management and 'control' to
stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the management and 'control' become for all
practical purposes absolute."195 To make managers trustees for the community would
free them of any meaningful constraint because almost all corporate activity could be
justified in the interests of one group or another.
In other words, Berle responded to Dodd from a progressive position strongly
opposed to giving managers added discretion in the emerging corporatist society. The
essay does not advocate shareholder primacy. Perhaps it gets that label because it is read
together with Dodd's attack. Dodd addressed only Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust,
a paper that by its terms addressed only corporate law writ small-managers and
shareholders as against each other with no reference to the wider political economy.
Dodd's attack lifted Berle's case for shareholder primacy out of the small corporate law
box and attacked it as Berle's statement of priorities in the wider political economic
context.
Berle's response, even as it defends the corporate law duty to shareholders, does not
assert that the shareholder interest can be viewed as a political and economic proxy for
the interest ofthe wider polity. It does, however, dance around that point. Berle saw stock
ownership as a means to "provide safety, security, or means of support for that part of the
community which is unable to earn its living in the normal channels of work or trade"196
and estimated that half of America's savings were in the stock market. 197 However,
shareholders got their legitimacy as passive recipients of wealth created. Shareholders
thus were the legitimate and only claimants to corporate profits, not necessarily because
they are the owners in the traditional property sense, but because they represented to

192. Berle, Tn/stees Note, supra note 9, at 1365.
193. !d. at 1367. One wonders whether this was an oblique reference to the fact that Dodd had practiced
law for only three years before becoming an academic. See Zachariah Chafee, Jr., Edwin Merrick Dodd, 65
HARV. L. REv. 379, 380 (1952). Berle also might have been deflecting attention from the fact that the
corporatists with real world experience were on the business commonwealth side; the planners tended to be
intellectuals. See HAWLEY, supra note 75, at 44.
194. Berle, Trustees Note, supra note 9, at 1370.
195. Id. at 1367.
196. Id. at 1365.
197. Id. at 1370.
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some extent the welfare of the general public. The shareholder interest, thus legitimated,
easily could be confined to a secondary role if the public interest required redirection of
the corporate entity's goals.
Meanwhile, discretionary managers jeopardized this legitimate flow of profits to
shareholders by both allowing managerial expropriation and inviting "economic civil
war.,,198 Without clear criteria, even well-intentioned managers would have little basis
for choosing among the competing interests of various constituencies. Recognizing this,
many groups would use force and threats-laborers would strike, shareholders would
sue, and consumers would boycott-to gain a greater share of the corporate wealth. 199
In any event, argued Berle, practicing lawyers were better suited than managers to
develop the law needed in the new corporatist state. Despite rare examples of managerial
visionaries like Mr. Swope and Mr. Young, one could not expect broad, enforceable
corporate reform to come from managers. 200 That job fell to lawyers, who were familiar
with the legal system and wrestled with it every day. Berle took care to include himself in
this vanguard, remarking that "as lawyers, we had best be protecting the interests we
know, being no less swift to provide for the new interests as they successively
appear.,,201 Thus, having designated himself the drafter, Berle set the stage for his own
corporatist proposal:
Either you have a system based on individual ownership of property, or you do
not. If not-and there are at the moment plenty of reasons why capitalism does
not seem ideal-it becomes necessary to present a system (none has been
presented) of law or government, or both, by which responsibility for control of
national wealth and income is so apportioned and enforced that the community
as a whole, or at least a great bulk of it, is properly taken care of. 202
But he went no farther. Like The Modern Corporation, Berle's response to Dodd
signals that something new is coming without telling the reader what he expects it to be.
Like The Modern Corporation, it only lays the groundwork. Meanwhile, the response
carefully limits its attack to the managerial vision of corporatism, lest it undermine
Berle's own yet-to-be-stated version. 203 Berle would succeed in getting FDR to make the
statement soon enough in the New Individualism speech. For whatever reason, he thought
the timing, June 1932, and the venue, the Harvard Law Review, inappropriate for a
statement of his full view.
Given all of this, does the response to Dodd stand for shareholder primacy? It does
so only inside the narrow context of corporate law, and then only subject to the proviso
that the national government still could take responsibility for stating the social welfare
function and imposing it on the managers.

at 1369.
199. Berle, Trustees Note, supra note 9, at 1368-69.
200. Jd. at 13 72.
198. Jd.

201. Id.
202. Id.

at 1368.
later commentator suggested that Berle added the social responsibility paragraph to the final chapter
of The Modern Corporation at the last minute to cover the flank exposed by Dodd. See SCHWARZ, supra note
21,at66.
203.

A
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C. Dodd Redux
In 1935, Dodd fired another shot in the debate, reaffirming his position as a business
commonwealth corporatist in an article entitled Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary
Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?204 Although by then Middle Berle was in
public view, Dodd again took aim at Early Berle. Berle's shareholder-centered vision, he
argued, had no foundation because the law could not make managers faithful to
shareholders (a position to which Berle himself had subscribed in the 1920s 205). Dodd
took cognizance of the last chapter of The Modern Corporation, but quickly dismissed it
because Berle himself had already shown in 1932 th<;tt "no legal principles exist by which
the managers of private enterprise can be made to serve the interests of persons other than
investors.,,206
Dodd's answer to the question posed in his title was an emphatic no. Fiduciary laws
would often be ineffective because management self-dealing was difficult to detect in all
but the most egregious circumstances and because managers had the power and influence
to limit any legislative or judicial attempts to enforce such laws. 207 Furthermore, from an
incentive standpoint, there was no reason to believe managers would selflessly forgo their
own profit maximization in order to be the faithful servants of the shareholders, a group
concerned only with profits. 208
Dodd's solution is surprising to us modems but is true to the business
commonwealth view. The answer was to free management from shareholder constraints
and to make managers servants of the community. But how could managers be trusted to
advance social welfare when they could not be trusted with their own shareholders'
capital? Dodd played the public/private card. Faithfulness of managers in the wider
context could be relied on because of the "strong emotional appeal,,209 of public service.
"Service to one's fellow workers, to those who have need of one's products, or to the
social and political community of which one is a member would seem a less abnormal
aim than vicarious profit-seeking.,,2l0
Dodd believed management would become a form of civil service, driven by the
managers' desire for prestige rather than pecuniary interests.
Such service has in most civilized communities, from the age of Pericles to the
age of Mussolini and Stalin, conferred upon the higher ranks of public servants
power and prestige unequalled by that given to any other class in the
community. . .. If, as has not infrequently been the case in the history of
western civilization, men have been educated to regard power and prestige of
204. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers
Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 194 (1935).
205. See supra text accompanying note 25 (referring to Berle's preference for the contractual approach for
interpreting charters).
206. Dodd, supra note 204, at 205 (citing Berle, Trustees Note, supra note 9).
207. !d. at 198-99 ("[E]nforcement of legal rules governing the conduct of a powerful group tends to be
ineffective unless the content of these rules finds approval in the minds and feelings of the more influential
portion of the group affected thereby.").
208. See id. at 205 (discussing the money-making goal of business enterprises and the effect that goal
inevitably has on managers).
209. !d. at 203.
210. Id.
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public office as more important than material riches, the attainment of a
relatively high standard of pecuniary honor on the part of public servants may
be-as the integrity of the English civil servants indicates-a matter of no great
difficulty.2J 1
As a final dig at Berle, Dodd suggested in the paper's last footnote that if courts had
adopted Dodd's viewpoint, rather than requiring managers to act for the benefit of
shareholders as Berle wanted, then the NlRA would have fared better under judicial
scrutiny.212
Dodd revisited his debate with Berle once again in a 1941 article entitled Modern
Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation. 213 This article marks
two significant shifts in Dodd's thinking.
First, his flirtation with corporatism was over. He no longer emphasized the
importance of management's relationships with other stakeholders, nor did he pick up his
previous arguments that shareholders had no rights to demand that the corporation be
managed for their benefit. It is not surprising that Dodd abandoned corporatism. Many of
Young and Swope's goals including unemployment insurance and social security, had
been incorporated into federal labor and employment policies. Where Berle envisioned a
dramatic overhaul of most of the laws affecting corporate activity, from antitrust to labor
issues to duties of the corporation, Dodd had proposed a relatively modest change in the
fiduciary orientation of managers,214 a change consonant with the ex ante power
structure. To Dodd, corporatism was only to be favored as a way of saving the preexisting capitalist system. But by 1941 capitalism had survived without centralized
government policies to reduce competition. The crisis resolved, Dodd had no further use
for corporatism.
Second, with corporatism a historical footnote, Dodd returned corporate law to its
narrow, private, profit-seeking box. Within the confines of the fiduciary model, Dodd
became skeptical of managers: "[A] situation in which the shareholder has to depend
rather on the conscience of the management than on his own legal rights is a dangerous
one.,,215 This statement was a sharp contrast with Dodd's earlier arguments that the
211. Dodd, supra note 204, at 203. It should be noted that at the time Dodd was writing, Mussolini and
Stalin were regarded as great statesmen.
212. Berle did not rise to the bait and respond this second time. But he did later consort with the business
commonwealth capitalists. The New Freedom faction gained ascendancy in the second Roosevelt
Administration and launched an antitrust offensive against big business when the economy collapsed again in
1937. Berle took a dim of view of this, a view he expressed in correspondence with Thomas Lamont of the
Morgan Bank. Lamont and Berle joined forces, determined to try to influence the administration to revert to
cooperation, and formed an ad hoc committee. It met at the Century Club in New York with Berle in the chair,
Lamont and Owen Young representing business, Tugwell and Charles Taussig representing the administration,
and John L. Lewis of the Council of Industrial Organizations and Philip Murray of the steelworkers' union
representing labor. Some political tradeoffs were agreed upon, and Tugwell arranged a meeting with FDR. FDR
was receptive, but the anti-business Brandeisians in his administration were not. They arranged for bad press at
the time of the meeting, embarrassing Lamont, and turned FDR away from the initiative thereafter. See RON
CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE

418-20 (1990) (detailing events and individuals contributing to the decision to hold the meeting).
213. Dodd, Modern Corporation, supra note 18.
214. It was especially modest given that, at the time of the first Dodd piece, it was not well established that
managerial obligations to shareholders survived the separation of ownership and control.
215. Dodd, Modern Corporation, supra note 18, at 927.
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majority of managers can be trusted. It followed that the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had been quite necessary. Here Dodd quoted
extensively from the early chapters of The Nfodern Corporation, and remarked that in
1932 the lack of power of dispersed shareholders over management "meant that to a
shockingly large extent the directors could without much legal risk sacrifice the
shareholders' interests in their own financial gain."216 That was why the new federal
laws were there:
For it is precisely because corporate owners have proved to be so largely
incapable of protecting their own interests either by means of their voting
power or through the ordinary processes of litigation that federal administrative
machinery has been set up, not for the purpose of regimenting owners but for
the purpose of furnishing them with safeguards which they are unable to
provide for themselves. 217
Dodd made one further adjustment to his thinking. In his view, the new federal
securities laws had successfully reset the balance of power between shareholders and
managers. Passed in response to the abuses in the corporate system, they targeted
precisely "those parts of the corporate system regarded as most clearly in need of
regulation."218 The combination of statutory mandate and delegation of enforcement
authority to the SEC strengthened the ability of shareholders to be informed and to use
their voting rights to wield real power. This places Dodd where Berle had placed himself
in the late 1920s: looking to market regulation to solve the problem of separation of
ownership and control. Where Early Berle had contented himself with self-regulatory
proposals,219 now Dodd could point to a mandatory legislative intervention.
What are we to make of Dodd's shift? With the federal securities laws in place and
the economic crisis having passed, Dodd returned to normalcy, in effect agreeing with
Early Berle's contention that shareholder protection was corporate law's guiding purpose.
This probably held out little gratification for Berle, who never returned to the position of
his early writings. Dodd, for his part, probably never intended to gratify.

D. Berle's Closing Concession
Berle returned to the debate with Dodd in 1953, two years after Dodd's death, and
again in 1954. The first occasion implicated Berle in the role of corporate lawyer, this
time as brief writer in an appeal to the Supreme Court on the losing side in A.P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow. 220 Barlow was the famous case in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court sanctioned corporate charitable contributions on a business judgment
basis without requiring a justification keyed directly to corporate profit. 221 The Supreme
Court appeal gave Berle a chance to secure doctrinal vindication of his 1932 shareholder
primacy position. His brief states:

ld. at 926.
Id. at 948.
ld. at 930.
See supra text accompanying note 25.
220. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d
221. Barlow, 98 A.2d at 581.
216.
217.
218.
219.

581 (N.J. 1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
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Neither social policy nor public benefit can justify a denial of the fundamental
principles that directors must manage the affairs of the Corporation as trustees
for the stockholders who own it, and that a contractual obligation exists to.
apply corporate funds only to objects authorized by the corporate charter. A .
denial of these principles would strike at the very basis of our economic system
of private corporate industry. 222
It soon would turn out that this stirring call for shareholder primacy reflected only
Berle's integrity as an advocate. The following year he would reverse his Berle-Dodd
position in a series of lectures entitled The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution. 223 Time
had proven Dodd the winner, he said. He would elaborate further in a back-and-forth with
Henry Manne in the Columbia Law Review in 1962, taking a short qualifying step
backwards:

[In t]he discussion I had with the late Professor E. Merrick Dodd ... I ... took
the same side that Professor Manne does now, though for rather different
reasons. I was afraid of corporate managements as social statesmen, or possibly
as controlling fund-donors for universities and other philanthropies, not
because I objected to the job being done, but because I thought corporate
managements were not especially qualified to do it. In doing it they might
revert to their classic profit-making function, and in that case would do the job
badly-or worse. Events and the corporate world pragmatically settled the
argument in favor of Professor Dodd. 224
Dodd, then, had been right only as a practical matter-a practical matter contingent
on the course of future events. By hypothesis, Berle maintained the view that Dodd had
not been correct at the time of publication in 1932. Berle's later reversal thus does not
signify unqualified acceptance of Dodd's status quo vision of managers as benevolent
hierarchical superiors.
What had changed? Berle believed that everything had changed upon Roosevelt's
1933 inauguration, a view he articulated in a series of post-war books and articles. 225
These works elaborate on the themes of the New Individualism speech, setting out a
political economy unique to their author. In this modified corporatist construct, two
prevailing conditions render corporate power benign: first, government management of
the economy from an unchallenged position of higher authority and, second, a solid
political consensus in support. Absent those essential conditions, there is no basis upon
which to infer from Berle an endorsement of management in a primary role as an
economic and social allocator.
E. Summary o/Berle-Dodd
The Berle-Dodd debate of 1932 is easily (and frequently) misread. When modem
scholars read the texts out of context, Berle appears to be the supporter of modem

222.
that the
223.
224.
225.

Statement as to Jurisdiction, Barlow v. AP. Smith Mfg. Co. 9, No. 383 (U.S. 1953). The brief argued
state's sanction of the gift violated the shareholders' vested rights under the Contract Clause. Jd.
BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 169.
Berle, Modern Functions, supra note 16, at 442-43.
See inji'a Part V (discussing Berle's post-war articles and books).
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shareholder primacy, which is a position he did hold, but only prior to his political
metamorphosis and only in the strict confines of corporate law. Dodd, on the other hand,
is interpreted in modem terms as a supporter of CSR. In fact, neither was supporting
either position. Both were speaking to the politics of their day, defending different
visions of the emerging corporatist state, BerIe' s on the left and Dodd's on the right.
Berle thus ended up as the putative great-grandfather of shareholder primacy by
happenstance, and, ironically, only because Dodd's attack placed him in that position. By
the time of the debate with Dodd, Early BerIe was history. Berle, now Middle Berle, saw
no principal role for shareholder primacy in his political economy.
At the time Dodd mounted his attack, the printed record did not yet reflect BerIe's
shift. The Modern Corporation was only just coming to publication. So Dodd attacked
the only BerIe in view-Early Berle-attributing to him a political economy based on
shareholder primacy. As a business commonwealth corporatist, Dodd attacked using
corporatist reasoning. Hence, it is Dodd's article that staked out BerIe as a shareholder
primacy advocate in the political context of the national crisis. Berle responded not by
defending shareholder primacy in the wider context, a position he had already abandoned,
but by using the shareholder interest to attack Dodd's advocacy of management
discretion to choose appropriate social goals in the new corporatist state. BerIe's response
thus amounts to a classic anti-managerial argument. But the shareholders figure into it as
mere stalking horses in a campaign directed against business commonwealth corporatism.
Berle's objective was to clear the field for the progressive version of corporatism. Even
as his anti-managerial argument is interpreted today to favor shareholder primacy, the
opposite was the case.
Unfortunately for modem readers, BerIe did not make this explicit. Our conjecture is
that his sensitive role as an advisor to Roosevelt had a disabling effect. The Berle-Dodd
debate appeared in May and June of 1932 when Roosevelt, almost certainly the
Democratic Party's presidential nominee, was only beginning the process of articulating
the main points of his New Deal. FDR would only publicly embrace progressive
corporatism in September when he delivered Berle's New Individualism speech. The
speech is the central statement of the Middle BerIe position, albeit without the usual
incident of public attribution. It confirms that the final chapter of The Modern
Corporation represented the views of its author.
Subsequent events make the 1932 debate even more problematic to modem readers,
and hence more difficult to decipher. Like ships crossing in the night, each made public
concessions to the other. Dodd, having abandoned corporatism and returned corporate
law to its narrow box of fiduciary duty and securities laws, could concede that Early
BerIe, the shareholder advocate, was right all along. On the other hand, post-war Berle
(who we call Late BerIe) remained the progressive corporatist of 1932. The NIRA and
the formal corporatism of the Roosevelt Administrations were long gone. But, in BerIe's
view, the post-war regulatory state nonetheless accomplished their key objectives. Hence,
Late BerIe could "concede" that Dodd's view of management had been proven correct
over time. The next Part lays out Late BerIe's political economy.

v. LATE BERLE: MODIFIED CORPORATISM
We have seen that the transition from Early to Middle Berle was rapid and radical.

136

The Journal ofCorporation Law

[Vol. 34:1

No such sturm und drang characterized Late BerIe's evolution. The difference between
Middle and Late BerIe is one of time and place, from the political actor in the midst of an
economic crisis to the mature academic in reflection in the midst of post-war plenty. Late
BerIe set out to summarize and restate Middle Berle's experiences as an enduring
political economy. The enterprise failed: while Middle BerIe's experiences could be
generalized, they endured only as long as did the political and econo'mic gestalt of the
New Deal.
Accordingly, we do not recount Late BerIe's political economy merely for its own
sake. We do so because it corroborates our reading of The Modern Corporation and of
the BerIe-Dodd debate. Simply put, Berle's 1954 embrace of the manager-statesman
confirms the legacy of The Modern Corporation and BerIe's continuing support for
greater government intervention in the workings of corpo(ations and the markets in which
they operated. The difference between Middle and Late Berle is entirely one of context;
the NIRA had failed, but a regulatory state had evolved to replace it.
Late BerIe articulated a corporatism modified for the American political framework,
jettisoning the theory's elaborate structure of group representation along with the unregretted NIRA. He instead described a strong American regulatory state that operated
under a pragmatic political settlement toward an end point in accord with corporatist
precepts. The critical assumption was that the state could and did accurately articulate the
social welfare function, guiding and pushing the markets to the right result. This
presupposed the cooperative engagement of interested parties. Just as in the 1932
campaign, BerIe was suspicious of competing interest groups. In fact, he avoided a theory
of groups altogether. Instead, he described a benign equipoise amongst strong
organizations, an equipoise constrained by a wider public consensus that empowered the
central government in the role of welfare maximizer.
Corporate managers emerged as quasi-public servants in this framework, as
advocated by Dodd in 1932. Whether they liked it or not, they were accountable to the
regulatory state on the one hand and the public consensus on the other. Failure to satisfy
the public meant new regulation; avoidance of new regulation meant satisfying the
public. It followed that public duties were unavoidable as a practical matter.
Shareholders, in contrast, remained what they had been in the response to Dodd in
1932-passive collectors of dividends with no productive role to play in the political
economy. As we will see, these characterizations were context specific. Berle provided
no theory with which to project them forward to today's very different political-economic
context.
Section A sets out BerIe's description of the post New Deal political economic
status quo. Section B goes on to BerIe's picture of the capitalist economy and the state's
necessary planning role. Section C takes up Berle's description of a political equilibrium
grounded in public consensus. Finally, section D turns to managers and shareholders.

A. The American Economic Republic
For Late BerIe the events of 1933 had a constitutional significance. Before 1933, the
economy and the polity had been separated, with the economy left to go its automatic
way. But the "open market" could not prevent periodically catastrophic rises or falls in
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the prices of goods: "It was not designed to.,,226 Catastrophe had resulted. Laissez-faire
responses to such market failures resulted in changes in political regimes-Hitler in
Germany and FDR in the United States: 227
The 1929 crash, the slow recovery of 1930, and the ensuing spiral descent into
an abyss of unemployment, bank failures, and commercial paralysis was not
corrected by market processes. The contemporary business captains, working
desperately (as they did) to meet the situ~tion, failed completely. Following
established precepts of the American political process, the public ...
increasingly asked that the political state propose a program and act.
Necessarily, this meant considerable reorganization of private business.... Out
of the crisis was born the American economic republic as we know today.228
Although the NIRA had failed, the state and the economy nonetheless emerged in
the "American economic republic"229 as interdependent, with the state taking ultimate
responsibility for economic results and exercising the higher level of power. 230 The old
economic order, with its private property and profit maximization engine persisted,231
and, incentivized by the profit motive, did the producing. 232 The state had intervened
only to stabilize its organizational lines and performance. 233 More extensive intervention
in the form of full-blown corporatism, complete with state economic institutions, had
been avoided, but only because sophisticated private actors had learned to moderate their
conduct. They had seen that the state's regulatory power took precedence over their own
economic power and accordingly had restrained the exercise of their power for the sake
of its preservation. 234 Writing in the 1960s, Berle expressed confidence that this modified
private order would persist for the foreseeable future. 235
An academic claim followed from this positive account. Berle thought that
economics without politics made no sense. 236 Issues like industrial concentration,
financial intermediation, and capital formation needed to be studied in a political
framework, because each implicated the creation and exercise of power in society, power
that sOclety inevitably would control through government economic policy. At the same
time, the political system was an instrument directed to the economic end of wealth
creation237 in order to satisfy the social organization's material needs. 238 That
226. ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REpUBLIC 82 (1963) [hereinafter BERLE, REpUBLIC].
227. Id. at 80.
228. Id. at 91.
229. ld. at 95.
230. ld. at 95, 99, 169.
231. BERLE, REpUBLIC, supra note 226, at 99.
232. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 94 (1959) [hereinafter BERLE, POWER].
233. BERLE, REpUBLIC, supra note 226, at 98-99. Keynes, said Berle, had shown that the state could
"stabilize, stimulate and direct" the economy without assuming dictatorial powers and without abolishing
private property. Id. at 5.
234. ld. at 169.
235. Id. at 99.
236. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 11-12,47-48; BERLE, POWER, supra note 232, at 13-14, 2l.
237. BERLE, POWER, supra note 232, at 13-14.
238. See BERLE, REpUBLIC, supra note 226, at 5-6 (stating that the primary function of the system of
political economy is to supply the materials from which a civilization is built).
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accomplished, society could take over as its members attempted to realize the good
life. 239

B. Economic Planning
Berle remained a planner. He believed that the economic conditions that brought
about the Great Depression were intrinsic to capitalism. Product markets were
incomplete, and price did not match supply and demand. The industrial production
machine, he asserted, could bring forth limitless goods, a capacity that had been achieved
for the first time in human history in the mid 1920s. 240 But there were persistent
problems-overcapacity gave management the discretion to set the level of production
wherever it wanted; at the same time, labor tended toward oversupply. This led to an
unpalatable either/or: either too many goods were produced or unemployment was too
high. Market correction implied catastrophic fluctuations and intolerable costs: starvation
for labor and bankruptcy for firms. 24 I The solution to the problem lay in a planned
equation of supply to demand. 242 Absent planning, he asserted, the economic conditions
that had brought about the Great Depression would have recurred in the early 1960s. 243
And, said Berle, most of the economy was in fact planned-directly in the regulated
industries 244 and indirectly in industrial oligopolies. 245
For Berle, increasing concentration and oligopoly conditions remained the way of

th~ future,246 and the balancing of supply and demand by actors in concentrated

industries had a political effect. 247 Government oversight accordingly was necessarythe price needed to be "administered."248 Whenever pricing power was abused or the

239. Id. at 5.
240. ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER 176 (1967) [hereinafter BERLE, POWER II]. Berle expressed no concerns
about incentives to innovate within big firms-there was no way to tell whether development worked better
inside or outside; the important thing was that the capital was there inside. Id. at 209-13.
241. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 226, at 78-79,82. Berle observed that, absent regulation, conditions in
1962 resembled those of 1930, heralding another depression. Id. at 217.
242. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 11-12.
243. BERLE, REpUBLIC, supra note 226, at 217. Berle expressed a parallel view respecting South American
economies-absent stabilization of the prices of export commodities, well-intentioned financial aid might just
go to waste. See ADOLF A. BERLE, LATtN AMERICA: DIPLOMACY AND REALITY 50 (1962) (explaining that more
than anything, the question was one of social organization).
244. Industry-specific regulatory mechanisms controlling entry, exit, and prices remained in place over
banking, ground and air transport, public utilities, broadcasting, petroleum, and shipping. BERLE, 20TH
CENTURY, supra note 19, at 49.
245. Within a concentrated industry, competition amounted more to a struggle for power to balance supply
and demand than to a struggle to gain market share through price competition. Competition continued within
the industry in the limited sense that one firm could not set prices at will. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 226, at
103-04. Meanwhile, abuse of economic power called for strong governmental responses. Monopoly pricing was
appropriately regulated by the antitrust laws due to possibilities of abuse of power. BERLE, POWER, supra note
232, at 129. So too was private price fixing-only the government had the right to fix the price. BERLE,
REpUBLIC, supra note 226, at 102. Unions that took advantage of a strategic position to extort special benefits
by wielding the strike weapon were seen as little better than gangsters. Here, too, state intervention was
necessary, but only as the occasion arose. Id. at 167-68.
246. See inFa text accompanying note 267 (noting Berle's updates of Means' concentration figures).
247. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 47.
248. BERLE, REpUBLIC, supra note 226, at 103. New industries would come into the system when they
grew large enough to have an impact on public welfare. At that point, stabilization plans would have to be
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public came to deem its exercise unacceptable in a given segment, or, alternatively,
competition broke out with destructive effects,249 regulation or informal intervention
could be expected, with informal means being preferred. 250 Here Berle was open to a
more explicit corporatist reform, advocating a post-war proposal made by Means for a
government board that would monitor the "economic performance" (as opposed to the
profitability) of all large firms and intervene as needed. 251

C. Political Processes and Controls
Berle built his political economy around two points: state economic management
could not be avoided and, at least in the American context, the state performing the job
was approximating the ideal of a benign maximizer. We tum now to the second point.
Berle backed up the benign state with a theory of "political forces.,,252 This abstracted
from history to offer a vision of natural selection of different political regimes. 253
"Good" regimes built on universal application and directed towards guaranteeing
"survival and growth" had superior evolutionary fitness. 254 What a political theorist
today might call "process," Berle called "apparatus."255 The better the political force, the
more its apparatus would sustain it effectively over time. Berle's exposition made no
mention of the American economic republic even as the theory just happened to justify it.
It was a naIve theory, but one that kept alive the cooperative idealism of the NIRA.
It also enabled Berle to present a theory with closure and make assertions about social
welfare. In corporatism the social welfare function was determined by the government
through a process of mediating among groups. Its implementation was brought about by
the administrative control of prices and wages, an intervention that determined the
income distribution.
In contrast, Berle's American economic republic posited closure as an outcome of a
well-functioning society. For Berle, the American political state had learned to take a
pragmatic and flexible approach to economic management, hewing to the premise of a
free society and eschewing grand theories. 256 Political decisions that determined the
social welfare function would simply emerge from the "apparatus" of public
consensus. 257 Planning was justified in response to "clear social demands."258 Actors
who wielded power, whether private or public, were expected to voluntarily observe the
worked out, with the unions cooperating. Id at 159-60.
249. 1d at 160.
250. BERLE, REpUBLIC, supra note 226, at 41, 103; see also BERLE, POWER II, supra note 240, at 201
(noting price policing by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson). There was no problem of a Leviathan state.
Government actors assumed new economic planning functions only reluctantly, because they presupposed a risk
of failure (with consequent political costs) and had no upside. BERLE, REPUBUC, supra note 226, at 67.
251. 1d at 160-61.
252. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., NATURAL SELECTION OF POLITICAL FORCES 17 (rev. ed., Univ. of Kansas Press

1968) (1950).
253. IdatI7-18.
254. Id at 86.
255. 1d at 24.
256. BERLE, REpUBLIC, supra note 226, at 15.
257. In Berle's view, the American public's value system-"vast, silent, nonestablished but still regnant"was the polity's essential organizing force. BERLE, POWER II, supra note 240, at 294.
258. BERLE, POWER, supra note 232, at 127.
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standards stated in the consensus. 259 This justifying consensus in tum followed from
prevailing customs respecting fair and equitable outcomes. 260 Citizens registered these
convictions through the political process. Although post-~ar pluralism hardly registers in
Late Berle,261 he did recognize the importance of groups. But he stressed that
participation was open to all-individuals had a "solid and respected political power" in
American democracy.262 All it took was a sufficient number of individuals to realize that
they were aggrieved, and political intervention would be "energized."263 The political
parties would listen, and then work the new input into common denominator platforms
that in the end appealed to the consensus. 264 Groups, then, provided inputs into a
consensus that always came back to Berle's corporatist starting point. 265

D. Corporate Power
1. The Political Position ofManagement
Berle extended and updated The Modern Corporation's picture of ever-increasing
corporate power in the benign post-war context. Before 1933, in The Modern
Corporation, Berle had seen collectivized corporate power as a problem. Now the power
stemming from the concentration of productive functions in the hands of a few provided
the means to realize a planned economy in which the interests of the community as a
whole came to bear on economic decisions. 266
Berle regularly brought Means' figures on concentration to date. Unfortunately,
things had not worked out quite as predicted. Means had projected that the largest 200
firms would account for 70% of production. By 1962, however, they supplied only 40%
of production. 267 Berle sidestepped accordingly, lowering the bar and stressing that in

259. BERLE, REpUBLIC, supra note 226, at 41.
260. Id. at 42--43.
261. The concept always made him suspicious. Interest group pluralism implied competition in pursuit of
self-interested goals and failure to cooperate, qualities he had derided in his arguments against the Frankfurter
and the New Freedom liberals in 1932. After the war, he denounced planning directed towards the defense of
special interests as irresponsible. Id. at 127. He did, however, acknowledge that interest group competition
could have the beneficial effect of preventing acquisition of excess power in anyone interest. Id. at 92. It is at
this level that Berle identified a pluralism he could embrace, but it was a pluralism consistent with his
preference for cooperation. The multiplicity of empowered institutions-states, firms, and labor unions-had
emerged in interdependent "equipoise," an equilibrium relationship in which no single institution had been
permitted to assume more than a handful of functions. Id. at 88. Berle thought this balance worked well.
262. BERLE, POWER, supra note 232, at 92.
263. Id.
264. ld. at 87-88.

265. Finally, Berle acknowledged that state power, like corporate power, could be abused. His yardstick
was purposive: the power wielded must be appropriate given the organization's function. Id. at 102. State
economic power, accordingly, should be exercised only toward economic ends. Such power became dangerous
to individual freedom when combined with other government functions or forms of power because
combinations of power have no tangible limit. Id. at 97-98.
266. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 32, 34-35.
267. BERLE, REpUBLIC, supra note 226, at 149. For earlier updates, see BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note
19, at 27 (claiming slightly more than half of industry is owned by less than 200 corporations); BERLE, POWER,
supra note 232, at 18 (claiming 500 corporations comprise 60% of industrial capital). Henry Manne extracted a
concession in 1962. Compare Henry G. Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62
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1962 the largest 400 to 500 firms did account for 60% to 70% of production. 268 As
industrial concentration (as thus adjusted) still waxed, so did management power. Berle
did acknowledge that product market competition, in particular the possibility of product
substitution, still exerted some pressure on management. But this, he stressed, was not the
market control mechanism expounded by Adam Smith. 269
In any event, the political context in which managers operated had changed for the
better. Now the legitimacy problems stemming from corporate power were worked out in
the de facto corporatist framework-the equipoise of strong organizations. There,
corporate power was constrained by the need to profit,270 by the residuum of competition
within oligopolies, by the labor unions, and, given misuse of power or a crisis, by the
state. 271 The consensus of public opinion lay behind all of these, operating slowly but, in
the long run, determinatively.272 It also bore on managers directly. Here Berle took a leaf
from Dodd: 273 for managers, as for politicians, violation of community values implied a
loss of prestige and esteem that undermined their place in the organization. The
corporation thus did have a conscience, one imposed by the community outside. 274
The corporate manager emerged as a "non statist civil servant,"275 a non-state actor
nonetheless subject to the consent of the govemed. 276 Social responsibilities followed. As
a wielder of power in the interdependent system, a manager would be held to
responsibilities to suppliers, customers, employees, and shareholders, along with other,
more peripheral constituents. This was an unenviable position. A manager could be
caught by surprise between the emergent public consensus and the responsive state,
grappling in the unfamiliar territory of political accountability.277 The best defense was a
satisfied American public. Happily, the U.S. public, unlike that in other countries,
imposed no unreasonable demands. So corporate leaders could manage their political
positions by honestly stating what they could and could not deliver, given their
constraints. 278
But the social role could not be avoided. Managers would exercise their business
judgment, but would do so in the shadow of the desired public policies. This was
different in degree but not kind with the corporatism of the NIRA. In the NlRA world,
codes of behavior were intended to be formally enforced. In the American economic
republic, business judgments had to anticipate social effects. Once the public consensus
registered in the social welfare function, the failure of corporations to take responsibility
meant forfeiture of the power to the state, and a less sound decision in the end. 279

COLUM. L. REv. 399, 400-01 (1962) (asserting that Means' concentration prediction had not been realized),
with BerIe, Modern Functions, supra note 16, at 434 (admitting a flat trend since 1932).
268. BERLE, REpUBLIC, supra note 226, at 149.
269. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 43-45.
270. BERLE, POWER, supra note 232, at 90.
271. Id. at 89-92; BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 53-59.
272. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 53-57.
273. See supra text accompanying note 172 (noting Dodd's claim that power leads to responsibility).
274. BERLE, POWER, supra note 232, at 90.
275. Id. at 8.
276. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 59-60.
277. BERLE, POWER, supra note 232, at 8.
278. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 59.
279. Id. at 172-73.
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2. The Role ofShareholders

In Late Berle's grand scheme, shareholders continued to playa passive role. The
capital allocation function had passed from the securities markets to the internal capital
market. Berle pointed out in 1954 that during the preceding six years, 64% of invested
capital had been financed by retained earnings and only 6% from new equity.280 It
followed that the stock exchanges no longer served primarily as places for new
investment and capital allocation, traditional functions only implicated in the rare
instance of a new issue of common stock. The markets instead served as mechanisms for
investor liquidity, a service provided for the benefit of the original owners' passive
grandchildren or the transferees of their transferees. The connection to capital gathering
and productive allocation was for the most part psychological. 281
The shareholders, earlier thrown up against Dodd as a countervailing interest,
dropped out of the governance picture. Federal bureaucrats wielding the securities laws
now patrolled the markets. 282 The annual election of directors played a minimal
legitimating role in the wider political framework-a ritualized community process
pursuant to a hoary legal template. 283 Proxy fights, which had taken the stage in the
1950s, did not imply renewed empowerment for equity capital. Although always a
possibility, such upsets would be rare and would tend to involve smaller films. 284 With
bigger firms, the vote was getting ever more dispersed, further diminishing its importance
and embedding passivity.285
All of this caused Berle to pose fundamental questions:
Why have stockholders? What contribution do they make, entitling them to
heirship of half the profits of the industrial system ... ? Stockholders toil not,
neither do they spin, to earn that reward. They are beneficiaties by position
only. Justification for their inheritance must be sought outside of classic
economic reasoning. 286
Berle repeated a point made against Dodd-passive property holders who wielded
no power still might be socially justified for their distributive role in the polity. The
shareholders used their wealth to provide for their families, pay their taxes, and support
charitable institutions. 287 But there was a catch: full justification for the shareholder
interest would follow only when shareholder wealth became so widely distributed as to
benefit every American family.288
280. ld. at 37-38 (acknowledging exceptions for utilities and new industries); see also BERLE, POWER,
supra note 232, at 45 (noting that 10%-15% of new capital came from pension funds and insurance companies

20% from bank borrowing).
281. Adolf Berle, Property, Production and Revolution: A Preface to the Revised Edition,

and

in ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xxvii, xxxiii-iv (rev.
ed. 1967) [hereinafter Berle, 1967 Preface].
282. ld. at xxxiii.
283. BERLE, POWER, supra note 232, at 104-05.
284. BERLE, POWER, supra note 232, at 63; see also BERLE, POWER II, supra note 240, at 260 (giving an
example of a failed proxy fight).
285. Berle, 1967 Preface, supra note 281, at xxxi.
286. ld. at xxxv.

287. ld.
288. ld.; see also Adolf A. Berle, The Impact of the Cotporatiol1 on Classical Economic Theory,

79

Q.J.
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Berle entered a caveat to this description. He noticed that more and more stock had
been accumulating in pension funds, insurance company vaults, and mutual funds. These
institutions, together with a handful of large New York banks operating as trust fund
custodians, constituted a new nucleus of power. He saw very clearly that this small
oligarchy could potentially exercise power over management as it accumulated and
deployed risk capital 289-an insight he already had noted back in the 1920s. 290 However,
so long as the investment intermediaries remained passive, they exacerbated the
separation of ownership and control, extending the distance between managers and the
individuals who were the ultimate beneficial owners. 29l It would be a different story if
the institutions woke up and exerted power over management tenure, ending
management's self-perpetuating oligarchy. But the separation of ownership and control
would not thereby be solved: one set of oligarchs, the managers, would be replaced at the
top by another, the self-perpetuating institutional managers. 292
E. Summary

Late Berle expanded the themes of the New Individualism speech into a general
political economy, picking up where The Modern Corporation left off and finally
integrating the corporation into the wider framework. Although sensitive to context and
new developments, Berle filtered them through a static framework set by the politics and
economics of the New Deal. He interrogated but dismissed new thinking in market
economics. Price would never match supply and demand in a politically acceptable mode,
and that was that. The political equilibrium that favored state planning would endure
because state planning was necessary because markets always failed, and that was that.
Formal corporatist structures did disappear from Berle's thinking, but the political
equilibrium provided a de facto substitute,293 and the assumptions and goals that had
animated his Depression-era corporatism remained in place.
Corporate legal theory today is about "governance," a phenomenon in which Late
Berie displayed little interest. He assumed that management adequately would play its
role of directing production, and that the constraints of fiduciary and securities law
assured an appropriate relationship between managers and shareholders. That
accomplished, shareholders, who held consumption rather than productive property, had

ECON. 25, 39 (1965).
289. BERLE, POWER, supra note 232, at 49-51.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27 (explaining the views of Early Berle). The difference was
that now execution had been eased by the federal securities laws-all the investment intermediaries would have
to do was combine and use the proxy process, ignoring managements' slates and substituting their own. BERLE,
POWER, supra note 232, at 53. But they were not yet exercising this power, instead following the Wall Street
rule and opting for exit over voice. For the moment, then, public opinion remained the more effective check on
managers than shareholder opinion. ld. at 53, 55.
291. BERLE, POWER, supra note 232, at 55.
292. Id. at 59-60.
293. Berle's description had a theoretical counterpart in JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967). Galbraith's picture leaves the competing groups free to make their own rules,
subject to government intervention to assure that excessive power does not accrue to one group. Free
competition is allowed to operate on a day-to-day level, but in an administered economy that guards against
excessive competition. The need for countervailing power precludes resort to market competition to choose the
winners.
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no public policy role to play. Their interest would come onto the policy screen only to the
extent that shareholdings become sufficiently dispersed as to merge the shareholder and
public interest into one. Berle showed remarkable prescience when he singled out
financial intermediaries as potential players within the corporation. But, from his
perspective, an institutional shareholder revolt that disempowered managers would not
amount to a governance revolution, only a coup d'etat~a shift from one empowered
group without inherent responsibility to another.
VI. BERLE (AND DODD) TODAY

This Part looks for intersections between the corporate legal theory of Berle and
Dodd and corporate legal theory today. The inquiry is counterfactual: if, based in their
texts, we were to resituate the two in today's context, what positions would they take? In
our view, the context has changed so much as to render the counterfactual exercise
hopelessly indeterminate. Both Berle and Dodd at some point stressed shareholder
protection, mentioned management empowerment with approval, and sanctioned the
socially responsible corporation. It is not at all clear who can claim either as a greatgrandfather. It follows that no one can. Or, alternatively, everyone can, in which event
the claims lack meaning. That said, some claims are much better than others.
A. The Contemporary Gestalt

Berle died in 1971. The framework of corporate legal theory changed abruptly soon
thereafter. Corporate governance was born. The precipitating economic context featured
stagflation, a failing stock market, the retreat of organized labor, and a perception of
national competitive decline in new global markets. Together these problematized the
productive and financial performance of corporate managers. The precipitating regulatory
context featured the corporate accountability scandals of the 1970s. 294 These
problematized internal governance structures.
Two touchstone publications of 1976 signaled and directed the resulting change of
approach. The first is Michael Jensen and William Meckling's paper, Theory ofthe Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. 295 This began a new line
of microeconomic theory296 that succeeded where classical microeconomics stopped
short, modeling the governance of large firms with separate ownership and control as
incidents of contracting among rational economic actors. Under the new approach,
optimal economic results became the end to be attained, and in the view of most of the
theory's advocates, shareholder value maximization appropriately proxied for optimal
economic results. 297 Thus was the shareholder interest situated at the economic margin as

294. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 619, 661-64 (2006) (describing the Watergate-era scandals).
295. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Stn/cture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
296. Their predecessor was Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), which
provided the first microeconomic explanation of the choices to produce in firms rather than through
independent contracts.
297. We note that not all financial economists agree. Reference is made to theoretical models addressing
optimal arrangements for sharing and transferring control between debt and equity interests. See, e.g., Phillippe
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the search commenced for an optimal corporate incentive structure. The searchers
favored market decisions over regulatory mandates and succeeded in inserting a
presumption against new regulation into corporate legal theory. Today, when something
needs fixing, market and self-regulatory solutions tend to be preferred.
The second publication is Melvin Eisenberg's book, The Structure of the
Corporation,298 which synthesized and materially advanced a generation of thinking
about the deficiencies of the received legal model of the corporation. For Eisenberg, the
inherited model could not be dismissed as antique but serviceable. If structural barriers
prevented shareholders from controlling managers, then the structure of the board of
directors needed renovation so that the board became an effective monitor of
management performance. 299 Eisenberg's monitoring model of the board of directors has
ever since been the main focus of legal corporate governance.
After Jensen and Meckling and Eisenberg published, the corporate landscape
changed dramatically. Hostile takeovers came and went, bringing to the fore new
conflicts between the management and shareholder interest. Institutional shareholders
emerged as active governance players, disrupting power relationships. Finally,
management incentives became a primary structural concern while internal controls
became a primary legal concern. Through all of this, the board's makeup, processes, and
performance loomed ever larger. 300 At the same time, debate devolved on a persistent
question: whether the emerging governance institutions paid adequate heed to the
shareholder interest.
There emerged two dominant schools of thought. The leading school is shareholder
primacy, which descends from the Jensen and Meckling model. It holds that management
in the shareholder interest maximizes value, partly as a matter of correct incentive
alignment301 and partly because it deems financial markets to be better deployers of
going-concern assets than actors in management suites. 302 The counter, managerialist
Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REv. ECON. STUD.
473,475-79 (1992) (discussing their model addressing the bilateral contracting problem); M. Dewatripont &
Jean Tirole, A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence. 109
Q.J. ECON. 1027 (1994) (discussing their theory on the capital structure of firms); see also Michael Jensen et aI.,
Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fi.x; Them 15
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=561305(''[C]onsistentwith'stakeholdertheory'valuemaximizing firms will be concerned about relations with all their constituencies. A firm cannot maximize value
if it ignores the interest of its stakeholders.").
298. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976).
299. Id. at 162-85.
300. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 1472-1500 (discussing changing board composition from 1950 to 2005
in relation to the rise of independent directors).
30 I. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996) (describing the corporation as a
"shareholders cooperative"); OLIVER E. WILLiAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALiSM (1985)
(emphasizing transaction costs); OLiVER E. WILLiAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GoVERNANCE 184 (1996)
(arguing that shareholders have residual claimant status with respect to both earnings and asset liquidation);
Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE LJ. 1197, 1210 (1984) (emphasizing shareholder
vulnerability).
302. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United
States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 122 (2001) (arguing that the growth of
capital markets and shareholder value during the 1980s and 1990s stemmed from deregulation and
technological advancements).
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school defends management discretion, and hence the legal status quo. 303 In the
managerialist view, managers and boards need insulation from shareholder directives in
order to deploy capital productively. Shareholder value is not necessarily rejected as the
ultimate end, but what unites the school is rejection of substitution of the shareholder for
management's business judgment. The flashpoint issues are tender offer defenses and
proxy process reform.
Both sides claim wealth maximization for the firm as the purpose in view. A third,
smaller school, CSR, rejects this single-minded focus on wealth maximization to argue
that corporations should take responsibility for externalities inflicted and individuals
injured in the course of business. 304 Here the broad objective is the insertion of social
welfare enhancement into the corporation's set of legal instructions, and the more
particular focus is on the interests of corporate constituents other than shareholders and
managers, particularly labor.

B. Dodd Today
A counterfactual re-creation of Dodd in the modern debate is made difficult due to
his early death in 1951 and the relatively narrow compass of his published work. 305 We
start by modeling modern Dodd as the Dodd of the business commonwealth corporatism
and the Berle-Dodd debate.
The CSR literature's references to Dodd are anchored in his advocacy of improved
employment conditions and higher wages for workers. But if we link Dodd to Swope and
Young, it becomes clear that CSR is not what Dodd was about. Unlike modern CSR,
Dodd was not asking senior executives and directors to accept a set of external
instructions that diverted resources to other stakeholders in the name of social welfare
enhancement. Dodd did ask corporate leaders to be enlightened, but then to use their own
discretion in deciding which stakeholders needed to be attended to in order to improve
their commitment to the enterprise. Swope and Young's New Capitalism amounted to a
pure management discretion position, not a CSR position. 30 6 Berle was correct when he
later characterized Dodd as a managerialist. But might Dodd have adjusted his stance to
align with CSR in wake of the late-twentieth century return to a market dominated
system? Not by the evidence of his later writing. Dodd disavowed managerial
corporatism in 1941 after the capitalist crisis had passed. 307 He pulled corporate law back
from political economy and reinserted it in the small box of statutes and case law. This

303. A range of views fall into this category. Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends o/COIporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 573-74 (2003) (arguing for management
empowerment under a shareholder-value maximand), with Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory o/Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 274-81 (1999) (describing a hierarchical governance
structure under board control without a shareholder-value maximand).
304. See David Millon, Communitarianism in COIporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1,4-10 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed. 1995) (discussing the communitarian view
on the social costs of wealth maximization).
305. Berle, in contrast, continued to write books relevant to the debate for another 20 years.
306. In the modem literature, the position closest to Dodd's is that of MITCHELL, supra note 17. Mitchell
accepts Dodd as a managerialist, duly noting his reservations, but adopting Dodd's managerialism as a second
(or third) best alternative in a context hostile to CSR.
307. See generally Dodd, Modern Corporation, supra note 18.
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makes it very difficult to make Dodd the great-grandfather of CSR either in terms of his
early or late writings.
Alternatively, we might take Dodd's 1932 managerialism as a basis for placing him
on the management side in the shareholder primacy debate. This is a better claim than
any other. Dodd did become concerned that managers might not be faithful fiduciaries,
but thought the problem largely resolved by the federal securities and state fiduciary duty
laws existing in 1941. The 1941 article places Dodd in the position of a supporter of the
post-New Deal legal status quo.
Finally, can we align Dodd with shareholder primacy? This is the least plausible
projection. While he certainly wanted managers to protect the interest of shareholders,
there is nothing in his writing that suggests that he wanted to give the shareholders more
power to decide critical issues. Satisfied with the legal status quo, he resists remodeling
on the shareholder primacy side.
C. Berle Today
Everything in Berle's political economy followed from two points. One point was
his optimism that the machines would keep humming along productively, unburdened by
management incentive problems leading to inefficiency. Managers might divert resources
to their own pockets rather than to the shareholders, but they would maximize the size of
the pie being baked. From a social welfare perspective, the main problem was the
coordination of supply and demand to avoid macroeconomic problems. Critically, this
task would be left to an activist federal government rather than to the markets.
The other point was the social consensus that provided Berle with a social welfare
function. For Berle, the consensus was a salient political fact justifying government
intervention for distributional purposes as well as for production efficiency. The
corporation could be asked to assist in achieving the desired outcomes; if it refused, the
government would impose the requirements on it. Whether the consensus ever existed is
a fair question. But without a social consensus there was no social welfare function, and
without a social welfare function, Berle's political economy had little to offer.

1. Shareholder Primacy
With these points in mind, we tum to Berle in relation to the shareholder primacy
school. He continues to be cited as the great-grandfather, based on Corporate Powers as
Powers. in Trust, the Dodd rebuttal, and The Modern Corporation's exposition of the trust
model. 308 As we have seen, the citations are accurate only in reference to Early Berle,
and a counterfactual Berle modeled only on Early Berle does not encompass the Berle of
The Modern Corporation and the debate with Dodd. Once Middle and Late Berle come
into view, any normative connections between his views and those oftoday's discussants
are incidental and tenuous. Berle's corporatism followed from theoretical assumptions
antithetical to shareholder primacy. Shareholder primacy privileges property rights and
markets. Berle believed that social welfare should trump property rights and that central
planning did better than markets in allocating economic resources.
Berle did take an anti-managerial approach resembling that motivating many of
308. See supra note 5 (citing sources connecting Berle to shareholder primacy).
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today's shareholder primacy advocates. 309 But even that connection is tenuous. Berle,
like Dodd and most corporate law academics at all times, distrusted managers' tendency
to self deal. To that extent there is a fit. But the anti-managerial tone of the Berle-Dodd
debate, the one for which Berle is remembered, followed from normative concerns very
different from those motivating today's discussants, concerns that took Berle to a
different end point. Simply, managers were making decisions impacting social welfare
that they were ill-suited to make. This called for political and regulatory constraint.
Shareholder primacy, in contrast, distrusts managers because managers are not owners
and accordingly have skewed incentives respecting the maximization of the value of the
firm. From this perspective, the concept of a social welfare function is foreign, and antimanagerialism implies shareholder empowerment.
We can draw a stronger line between Berle and today's shareholder primacy by
putting his normative framework to one side and shifting to the descriptive level. The
Modern Corporation is remembered above all else for the positive observation that a
separation of ownership and control impairs the governance of large public
corporations. 310 Today's shareholder primacy/management discretion debate addresses
the continuing question whether separation of ownership and control presents a
governance problem calling for structural reform. Shareholder primacy advocates say
yes, management defenders say no. Strictly speaking, the shareholder primacy side can
cite Berle in support of this proposition. 311
But the common emphasis on the separation of ownership and control does not
suffice to align Berle with shareholder primacy. The connection can be made only by
putting Berle's radically different normative perspective to one side, and, for Berte, the
whole point of the separation of ownership and control diagnosis was normative. It meant
that private property rights by themselves did not assure the corporation's responsible
operation. It followed that the corporate legal entity, a construct theretofore thought to be
private, should be re-characterized as public. Today's separation of ownership and
control discussion proceeds in an entirely private, property rights-based context. We still
use the appellation "public corporation" bequeathed by BerIe and Means, but today the
appellation is descriptive only, referring to public trading of a majority of the stock and
nothing more.
For Middle BerIe, the separation of ownership and control meant that managers
amounted to an illegitimate aristocracy-they were "princes of property" rather than the
"neutral technocrats" he wanted to see because they made public welfare decisions
without being publicly accountable. Including shareholders in the corporate decisionmaking process (assuming there was a meaningful way to do so) would do nothing to
solve the problem. Accountability to the general social body does not follow once the
duly activated owners of property constrain their princes. The activated owners come
from an elite (and, by hypothesis, empowered) segment of society-institutional fund
managers, a segment that itself is not comprised of ultimate owners.
BerIe admitted shareholders into his social welfare calculus only in a distributive
309. For a recent anti-managerial example, see LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSAnON (2004).
310. Bratton, supra note II, at 753-59.
311. Indeed, Berle's separation of ownership and control made a significant return to salience in the 1990s
after a period of eclipse by the new financial economic model. Id.
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sense, as economic interest holders. The shareholder interest would weigh in as a positive
in his social welfare calculus only to the extent shareholding was widespread among all
social classes. 312 The proliferation of pension funds has made the shareholder interest
more and more distributionally salient. But "full" legitimacy in Berle's sense certainly
has not been achieved. The wealthy own most of the shares and it is an unusual social
welfare function that weighs the importance of individual preferences by the number of
shares owned.
Indeed, as between today's advocates of shareholder primacy and management
discretion, we can more easily imagine Berle choosing the managers from a fallback
position. Today's movement to empower shareholders would make Berle suspicious. The
present environment poses a choice between governance interruptions by market-based
holders and intermediaries (many of whom look for short-term gain) and governance
from within the corporate institution. Given the choice, much in Berle signals that he
would put his anti-managerial suspicions to one side and privilege internal, management
control. He prized stability above all and mistrusted markets as deployers of capital.
2. Corporate Social Responsibility
Berle certainly can be cited for the proposition that managers should be socially
responsible-that was what the "public corporation" was all about. But that still makes
him only a collateral antecedent of today's CSR advocates, not a great-grandfather. Here
too there has been a change of context. Berle envisioned and sanctioned CSR only within
a wider corporatist framework. His post-war consensus story specified that the public
registered its demands for social responsibility only at "reasonable" levels. 3 13 He said
nothing about the line between reasonable and umeasonable. Nor did he project a picture
of management duties in a deregulated state in which foreign competition denuded the
salience of domestic industrial oligopolies.
Berle witnessed trouble brewing to his left in his late years. 314 CSR as we know it
today descends from those troublemakers. Progressives in the 1960s and 1970s were not
getting all the public legislation they wanted and no longer saw the post-New Deal
regulatory state as a responsive agency. In corporate law circles the result was a push to
insert social welfare maximization into the legal model of the firm. 315
Berle holds out no authority for that proposition. We have described the last chapter
of The Modern Corporation as a temporary patch. 316 Based on Late Berle, it is fair to say

312. For discussion of the progressive tradition of shareholder democracy, and its roots in Early Berle, see
Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1503,1528-35 (2006).
313. See supra text accompanying note 278 (noting Berle's belief at the time that the U.S. public's
demands were not unreasonable).
314. The review of Power Without Property in the New York Times Book Review described the book as a
"touchstone" for the problem faced by a corporate liberal at a time when the New Left was "ascendant."
SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 369. Berle, writing in 1968, dismissed the New Left as anarchistic. See BERLE,
supra note 252, at 109-10.
315. See Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance
System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REv. 343, 404-33 (1981) (describing and mooting
various reform proposals).
316. See supra text accompanying note 147.
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that the patch held and that Berle saw no inconsistency in a book that talked shareholder
value in one part and social welfare in another. The key was the corporatist state. Middle
Berle saw managers with duties to shareholder constituents going to the corporatist table
as their interest representative subject to later cooperation with any overriding social
welfare instruction derived by the government. Late Berle substituted the combined set of
national regulatory directives and national political consensus, with its "reasonable"
demands that fit neatly within management's business judgment envelope. He grappled
with neither stepped-up demands on the left, nor a countervailing shareholder voice on
the right.
Berle's progressive values do resonate with contemporary CSR. Even so, we can
easily imagine Berle making the standard objection to today's CSR317-so far as
concerns corporate pursuit of social goals, outside regulation works better than an openended internal social welfare instruction because it makes for a more coherent
governance system and enhances political legitimacy. Labor, environmental, consumer
protection and antitrust regulation all contain the discretion vested in managers by
corporate law. Taxation and benefits take care of redistribution. This inside/outside
settlement dates back to the early twentieth century, survived the Great Depression, and
today seems more stable than ever. As to all of these points, Berle can be cited directly.
Thus projected, Berle remains as progressive as ever, but argues for regulatory reform at
the federal level, not for revision of the legal model of the corporation.
VII. CONCLUSION
When all is said and done, who in today's debates legitimately can claim a greatgrandfather in Dodd or Berle, and what, if anything do these texts have to say to us
today?
As between Berle and Dodd, today's jockeying claimants see Berle as the bigger
prize. Berle after all, had the more distinguished public and academic career. Even more
importantly, the dominant shareholder primacy school's standing claim on Berle triggers
counterclaims by opponents seeking to score points. So the question is whether the
shareholder primacy side advances its cause by hitching its wagon to Berle. The answer
is no. Berle can be invoked directly for the shareholders only by reference to early
pronouncements he later abandoned. By the time of The Modern Corporation, Berle is on
the opposite side from today's shareholder primacy advocates. The only connection is at
a secondary, descriptive level. The connection lies in his identification of a problematic
separation of ownership and control, but the connection is weak. For Berle, the remedy,
given the diagnosis, was corporatism. Had Berle's views prevailed in history, the
shareholder interest would not have benefited.
Berle addressed the question "for whom is the corporation managed" at a time when
the answer had crucial implications for social welfare. In answering the question, Berle
articulated a political economy that integrated a theory of corporate law within a theory
of social welfare maximization. It was a corporate law and economics theory, a corporate
law and politics theory, and a corporate law and society theory. It was plausible in its
day, and, as stated, achieved theoretical closure. That closure of course relied on two

317. Bratton, supra note I, at 71-74.
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assumptions now viewed as heroic~a benign, maximizing state and an exogenous and
efficient production function free of agency costs. Still, it was a great accomplishment.
Today's shareholder primacy/management discretion debate proceeds in a much
narrower framework. The debate asks "for whom the corporation is managed" only inside
the narrow corporate law box. Therein the theory of the firm is reduced to interactions
among only three actors~managers, directors, and shareholders. There are good reasons
for the reduction of scope. But, whatever the reasons, the reduction makes it impossible
to claim positive social welfare consequences or even to discuss the matter at all.
Shareholder primacy can acquire broad social welfare implications only outside the box,
and then only if heroic and implausible assumptions are made first~for example, that
shareholders are representative of the body politic.
Thus, the biggest lesson from this analysis is that the shareholder primacy school
seriously impairs its own position by making a claim on Berle. Hitching your wagon to
Berle, in any substantive manner, forces you to take on the broader social issues that were
key to Berle's entire approach to corporate law. Not only was Berle on a side of the
debate rarely heard from today, but he addressed a different and bigger question than do
today's discussants. Far from being an offspring, shareholder primacy contradicts Berle
rather than succeeds him.
Berle has lost the debate in history, and, at least for now, shareholder primacy has
won. Simply stated, we have shareholder primacy today because corporatism lost out to
pluralism and markets. With the broader political economic conflict for now resolved
against Berle, his legacy is presently limited to the fact that he and Means were among
the first to identify and analyze the separation of ownership and control which remains to
his day corporate law's core problem. Corporate legal theory must confront the
:eparation and hold out a cure. Shareholder primacy does that, at least within the
:orporate law box, and so takes over as the favored policy position in the wake of
orporatism's disappearance from the wider political economy. But it has no implications
)r social welfare.
Meanwhile, the changed political economy throws up a formidable barrier to a CSRlsed claim on either Berle or Dodd. When Berle and Dodd endorsed socially responsive
~anagement they assumed that markets did not work and government planners would be
tting prices and influencing corporate policy. Suppression of the market opens a zone
. allocational space for the firm. Social responsibilities follow ineluctably~they are the
veback for protection from price competition. The historical eclipse of corporatism and
urn of firms to the product markets shrinks the zone of discretion and enervates the
fe-back imperative. It becomes plausible to remit corporate responsibility to the
~latory state and the tax collector. A presumption accordingly arises in favor of
ving social responsibility and social welfare out of the legal model of the corporation.
e problem for CSR is to find a way to overcome that presumption.
Our reconsideration of Berle and Dodd suggests that overcoming the presumption
supposes loss of confidence in free market capitalism and a concomitant political
Istment in a corporatist direction. Without that adjustment, CSR's social welfare
jmands suffer the legitimacy problem Berle identified and lack a sovereign enforcer.
~ is left to exhort managers to be good.
If no contemporary corporate law discussant has a strong claim on Berle or Dodd, a
:tion arises: Should we consign them to the scrap heap of old irrelevant texts? The
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answer is no because regulatory regimes can change. Berle's political economy offers a
framework for thinking about regime change and what it means for corporate
governance. The first key for Berle was cooperative participation by regulators and
managers in a common enterprise. In his first, formally corporatist vision of this,
manifested in the NIRA, the state would join corporations and their constituents in a
special regulatory apparatus. Later, that experiment having failed, Berle accepted a more
fluid model in which state power encouraged cooperative engagement even as the state
for the most part stayed its hand. Berle's model showed that property rights need not
necessarily be a barrier to cooperative regulatory regime and that the public-private
divide can be traversed given the right incentive alignment. All depends on Berle's
second key-an empowered state with an agenda that calls on corporations to serve as
means to regulatory ends and a solid base of public support. Neither key has been
available for use for many years, but the future may hold out new opportunities.
The Modern Corporation leaves us with two messages. One registers today in the
small box of corporate law, where the separation of ownership and control still presents
an agency problem for solution. The other, a potential future message, is for the wider
regulatory state: the state does not have to own and control corporations in order for
corporations to serve public purposes. Corporations can serve their shareholders even as
they accommodate demands registered by the wider public and channeled through the
state.

